Essays on Interservice Rivalry and American Civil-Military Relations

How does interservice rivalry affect American civil-military relations? In three essays, I develop theoretical propositions about the relationship between interservice rivalry and civil-military outcomes; propose a two-stage model of civil-military interaction surrounding use of force decisions; and investigate the correlates of interservice rivalry with a focus on budget pressure.;Essay 1 provides a theoretical foundation through a bureaucratic politics approach. The literature predicts that interservice rivalry benefits civil-military relations by increasing civilian access to the military's private information and reducing the military's bargaining power. I suggest that interservice rivalry also has negative effects, driving apart civilian and military world views and providing incentives for service hyperspecialization and unprofessional military behavior. I support this argument with a case study of the 1949 Revolt of the Admirals.;Essay 2 explores the puzzle posed by the Vietnam War. I argue that conflicting evaluations of the quality of civil-military relations can be explained by recognizing two distinct military obligations: to contribute private information and expertise to policymaking, and to obey civilian directives. I propose an informal two-stage model of use of force decisions in which civilian policy preferences are influenced by military advice, and advice quality is difficult to monitor. I hypothesize that a large civil-military preference gap is more likely to result in military shirking in the advising stage than in the implementation stage, and that interservice rivalry is more problematic in the advising stage than in the implementation stage, given its relative effects on the preference gap and on the civilian's capacity for monitoring and punishment.;Essay 3 asks when interservice rivalry is likely to be high or low, investigating the plausibility of recent predictions that fiscal austerity and a realignment of military priorities will spark increased interservice rivalry. I explore this question using a newly constructed measure of interservice rivalry based on New York Times reporting from 1948 -- 2012. My findings support the hypothesis that a move away from equal budget shares for each service will increase interservice rivalry, but do not support the hypothesis that fiscal austerity generally leads to higher levels of interservice rivalry.