Simulation Study Of Endogenous Evolution And Suppression Of "Potential Rules"

"Potential Rules" is a kind of rule which is free from the written rules,but can not be put on the table in the formal situation.There are many types and forms of "Potential Rules".Among them,"Interest Transmission" is a common type of"Potential Rules",and its essence is also a problem of equilibrium choice of multiple equilibrium games.This paper takes the type of "Potential Rules of Interest Transmission" as the research object.Combining the Inductive Game Theory and imitation learning in the Theory of Learning in Game,the aim of this paper is used to explore the choice of multiple equilibria.The method of simulation is used to observe the strategy choice of subjects under different real conditions and different objective payoff matrix.The final convergence of simulation is used to reflect the influence of some influencing factors on the balanced choice of game.Combined with the endogenous view of institution,this paper explores the endogenous evolution process of "Potential Rules" and the influencing factors of "Potential Rules”evolution through simulation.But more importantly,how to suppress the spread of "Potential Rules" is also a problem that we are more urgent to solve in reality.In practical justice,we often pay more attention to the severe punishment of the bribee in the "Potential Rules",but the punishment to the briber is lighter,is this appropriate?so we explore the impact of strengthening the punishment on the briber on the outcome of the game equilibrium.Because the subject is affected by many factors,such as their own growth experience,education background,social environment and values and others,in the choice of strategy,we modify the subjective probability of the subject,and explore the influence of these factors on the strategy choice of the game subject and the final convergence of the game.The main contents of this article are as follows:1)Assuming that there is no social preference for the players of the game,and that the players know nothing about the objective payoff matrix of the game.The third strategy,namely the "Potential Rules" strategy,is evolved through trial and error in the original strategy concentration with only two strategies through imitation learning and repeated games.In this paper,a game simulation model with multiple equilibria is established from the perspective of interest transmission.The final convergence result of the game is observed through the change of the value of interest transmission U and the probability of each subject's initial attempt to "Potential Rules",and the influence of these two factors on the endogenous evolution of"Potential Rules" phenomenon is explored.2)Considering the effect of restraining the phenomenon of "Potential Rules" by punishing the bribee and adding the punishment to the briber.We modify the objective payoff matrix of the above game and add some parameters to achieve the effect of restraining the spread of "Potential Rules".They are the probability p1 of the briber using "Potential Rules" to be found,the probability ph of the bribee using"Potential Rules" to be found,and the punishment a of "Potential Rules".The payoff of collection of each strategy combination in the objective payoff matrix is calculated by the way of expected value.Through the simulation of different combinations of three parameters,the final convergence results of the game under different combinations are observed,and the inhibition effect of punishing the briber on the"Potential Rules" phenomenon is explored.3)Considering that each subject is influenced by many factors,such as self experience,surrounding cases,publicity and so on,when making decision,this chapter explores the influence of many factors on the choice of game subject's strategy by modifying the subjective probability of game subjects.We can change the probability of subjects choosing different strategies through two aspects of their own game situation and the influence of broadcasting effect in the society.We can compare the inhibition effect of "Potential Rules" only through their own game experience before,and add another broadcasting mechanism to better simulate the state of people when making decisions.In the model,by adjusting the proportion of two factors in subjective probability,we can observe the inhibition effect of these factors on the "Potential Rules" phenomenon.Through the research of this paper,we can draw the following conclusions:1)In a certain institutional environment,the third strategy with the characteristics of "Potential Rules" will spread to other subjects and become a guide to the behavior of subjects.At the same time,the diffusion of "Potential Rules" strategy is related to the value U of interest transmission and the probability of the initial attempt to"Potential Rules" by the subject.2)The strategy of "Potential Rules" will not spread in the environment of certain punishment and certain probability of being found,and the subject will not tend to choose the strategy of "Potential Rules" through learning and strategy adjustment.By punishing the two kinds of subjects in the "Potential Rules",we find that under a certain degree of punishment and a certain probability of being found,the "Potential Rules" strategy will not spread,and the effect of restraining "Potential Rules" is very similar to that of punishing briber and bribee respectively.In reality,due to the"survivor bias" and other reasons,it is a good way to restrain the "Potential Rules"behavior to strengthen the punishment and supervision of the bribee.3)Adding positive publicity mechanism to the subjective model of game players can make the diffusion of "Potential Rules" more difficult.In this chapter,simulation experiments show that with the proportion of positive publicity in individuals increasing,the inhibition effect of "Potential Rules" strategy diffusion is more obvious.The innovation of this paper is to explore the equilibrium selection problem of multiple equilibrium games by combining the game learning theory and Inductive Game Theory with computer simulation technology,and to explain how the "Potential Rules" evolved endogenously by combining the endogenous view of the institution,and to restrain the spread of the "Potential Rules" by improved means of punishment mechanism and subjective probability revision.The conclusions of this paper provide a strong basis for relevant policy measures and judicial formulation.