Research On Evolutionary Game Of Coal Mine Safety Supervision Based On Replicator Dynamics And Moran Process

The evolutionary game theory believes that the players in the game are bounded rationally,and the game equilibrium is achieved through continuous learning in the game process.Evolutionary game theory has been widely recognized since it was put forward,and has been widely used in fields such as mathematics,physics,and biology.The learning mechanism based on replication dynamics and the learning mechanism based on random processes are two typical learning methods of evolutionary games.China's coal mine safety production situation is severe,and coal mine safety management is difficult.The coal mine safety supervision process involves multiple game participants such as coal miners,coal mining enterprises,local supervision departments,and national supervision agencies,all of whom have the characteristics of bounded rationality.Therefore,the evolutionary game analysis of coal mine safety supervision based on the replication dynamics and random process learning mechanism is of great significance.Based on the replication dynamic learning mechanism,the evolutionary game analysis of coal mine safety supervision is carried out.Two group evolutionary games between local regulatory agencies and coal mining enterprises are studied: the game strategies of coal mining enterprises and regulatory agencies are portrayed as safety production investment and safety supervision investment,respectively,and the probabilities of coal production safety and supervision finding problems are defined.By introducing the speculative behavior of coal mines enterprises and regulatory agencies,an evolutionary game model is established,and the evolutionary stability strategy of coal mining enterprises and regulatory agencies is obtained;the influence of system parameters on the evolution process and evolutionary stability points is studied through numerical experiments.The evolutionary game analysis of the two groups of state supervisory agencies and coal mining enterprises is studied.A model of the game behavior between the state supervisory agencies and coal mining enterprises is established.Based on the introduction of speculative behaviors between coal mining enterprises and supervisory agencies,The game decisions are defined continuously.The evolutionary stability strategy of the state supervisory agency and coal mining enterprises is obtained.The influence of the system parameters on the evolution process and the evolutionary stability point through numerical experiments is studied.The evolutionary game analysis of national supervisory agencies,local supervisory agencies,and coal mining enterprises is studied.The game strategy of coal mining enterprises is described as the degree of safety effort,and the probability of coal mine production safety is used to describe the punishment of supervisory agencies on coal mining enterprises.Three-group evolutionary game model of coal mine safety supervision is established.The influence of system parameters on the evolution process is studied through numerical experiments.Based on the Moran process,The evolutionary game analysis is carried out on the population of coal mine workers,the population of coal mining enterprises and the population of regulatory agencies,respectively.The single-species evolutionary game of coal miners is studied.The feasible strategies of coal miners are divided into exerting effort and not exerting effort,and the evolution model of coal miners is obtained by analysis.The rooting probability and state transition matrix of the strategy are obtained by calculation.The results are obtained by analysis.The influence of system parameters on the rooting of the strategy is discussed.The single-species evolutionary game of coal mining enterprises is studied.The feasible strategies of coal mining enterprises are divided into exerting investment and not exerting investment,and the evolution model of coal mining enterprises is obtained by analysis.The rooting probability and state transition matrix of the strategy are obtained by calculation.The results are obtained by analysis.The influence of system parameters on the rooting of the strategy is discussed.The single-species evolutionary game of the supervision department is studied.The feasible strategies of the supervision department are divided into doing supervision and not doing supervision,and the evolution model of the supervision department is obtained by analysis.The root probability of the strategy and the state transition matrix are obtained by calculation.The result is obtained by analysis.The influence of system parameters on the rooting of the strategy is discussed.The paper has 21 pictures,11 tables,and 63 references.