Research On Government Supervision Of Domestic Waste Classification And Recycling In Franchised Enterprises ——Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

In the past,municipal solid waste（MSW）classification and recycling services were dominated by the government.With the rapid increase in the amount of waste making the government’s financial burden increasingly heavier,the market mechanism is gradually introduced to form a situation where franchised waste sorting and recycling enterprises（hereinafter referred to as franchised enterprises）and the government participate together.However,because the government aims at maximizing public interests and the franchised enterprises aim at maximizing their own interests,there is a conflict of interest between them.In order to expand their own interests,franchised enterprises may conduct behaviors that are detrimental to the public interest and disrupt market order.Therefore,it is of practical significance for the government to supervise the garbage collection behavior of franchised enterprises in the MSW classification and recycling service.In this thesis,the government how to realize the effective supervision on franchise enterprises behavior were studied.Firstly,the evolution process of the behavior between the government and franchised enterprises under static regulation is studied.Based on the evolutionary game theory,the game model between government and franchised enterprises is constructed to simulate the game process of strategic choice between government and enterprises.By establishing the game model of government and franchised enterprises under static regulatory strategy,it is found that government regulatory behavior and enterprise participation behavior are affected by different parameter conditions under static pure strategy.Moreover,in the case of mixed strategy games,the two parties play cyclical games,which is related to the delay,incompleteness and complexity of information obtained by both parties in reality;Secondly,we further study the influence of government regulation on the behavior choice of franchised enterprises under the dynamic reward and punishment system,and find that the stability point of the model is related to the cost and benefit of government regulation and the cost and benefit of enterprises.Then,on the basis of the results of the evolutionary game,MATLAB software is used to simulate and verify the conclusions of the evolutionary game model to provide reference for government departments.Research conclusions are drawn: Firstly,under the static pure strategy,the strategy choice of the government and franchised enterprises is affected by the difference between their own cost and benefit;Secondly,under the static mixed strategy,the evolutionary game between the government and franchised enterprises has periodicity,and the game model does not have a stable point;Thirdly,under the dynamic strategy,the government can reduce the supervision cost and improve the supervision efficiency of franchised enterprises by adopting the dynamic reward and punishment method in different stages;Again,High penalties can make f franchised enterprises choose to participate in garbage sorting and recycling strategies;Besides,the dynamic subsidies adopted by the government can reduce the participation cost of enterprises.Suggestions are as follows: Governments should reduce the cost of regulation,optimize the regulatory responsibility system,develop a dynamic punishment and subsidy system,so as to improve the supervision efficiency of the government on municipal solid waste classification and recycling enterprises.