Differential Game Model For Transboundary Pollution Treatment And Its Application

Transboundary pollution in the context of economic integration has become a key issue in environmental governance process.The reason is that the characteristics of transregional mobility and continuity lead to the difficulties of transboundary pollution control and emission accountability greatly increase.In the research method,at the same time,the traditional game theory is difficult to accurately find the equilibrium strategy of dynamic game model.Therefore,this paper constructs differential game models concerning transboundary pollution under several cases according to the structure of transboundary problems.This paper’s goal is to investigate the optimal control strategies of each party in the game and treatment scheme of transboundary pollution.In the first two chapters,this paper gives the basic concepts and theories required for this paper.The research status concerning the existing environmental pollution and control schemes is then given.Based on the cross-basin water pollution framework,this paper introduces competitive relationship into water pollution management game in Chapter 3,constructs stochastic water pollution differential game models under the perspectives of Nash non-cooperative game and Stackelberg leader-follower game,respectively.Then the optimal production,emission reduction strategy and the optimal value function of the models are solved and analyzed.Finally,the evolution state of state variables is deeply analyzed,and the empirical analysis is carried out with the data of Xin ’an River Basin.The results show that the pollutant reduction effect of different regions shows obvious variability characteristics in the game.Secondly,different regions have different tendencies towards the game type based on the interest perspective.Finally,the sensitivity analysis of pollutant stock shows that the key to achieve regional synchronous pollution emission reduction is the governance of the upstream region,whether it is Nash game or Stackelberg game.In Chapter 4,this paper further introduces the market mechanism of pollutant trading into transboundary pollution game to discuss the optimal control strategy under competition condition.From the principle of maximizing the respective net flow of benefits,transboundary air pollution non-coalition game model is constructed.In addition,a coalition differential game model is formed to maximize the joint benefits of the participants.The optimal emission,abatement effort strategies and value functions of players are solved separately.This paper then compares the optimal equilibrium strategies of the regions under the two models and illustrates the effect of trading price on emission reduction management.Based on the transboundary air pollution data of Beijing and Hebei region,the pollutant stocks and value functions of each parties in the model are empirically analyzed.The study shows that the pollution control effect of each region and comprehensive economic benefit in the coalition game are better than that in the non-coalition game.Based on the above conclusions,to enhance collaborative emission reduction,this paper constructs a two-level planning model in Chapter 5.To improve the efficiency of the solution,subsequently,a hierarchical particle swarm algorithm is designed for model.The model coefficients are determined by regression analysis by collecting the cost of sulfur dioxide emission reduction and investment in the three provinces over a ten-year period.The results show that the equilibrium solution of the model involves a compensation standard of 521.48 yuan/ton and a penalty rate of2977.43 yuan/ton;emission allowances of 37.72,30.32,and 69.32(million tons)are set for Heilongjiang,Jilin,and Liaoning provinces,respectively.The above reward and penalty standards and emission credits were set so that the provinces’ sulfur dioxide removal was significantly enhanced,while the emissions were lower than the environmental carrying capacity.Finally,a detailed summary is presented in Chapter 6,and the limitations and further perspectives of this paper are demonstrated.This paper has a total of 14 pictures,9sheets,102 references.