Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument

Later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language mainly investigates ordinary language use in everyday life. Wittgenstein’s private language argument has always been the primary concern of western philosophers and scholars. Wittgenstein puts forward the important notion of "form of life" and takes it to be the premise of philosophical investigation. Wittgenstein sees the practices of language as "forms of life". In Philosophical Investigations, when Wittgenstein discusses rules, meaning and understanding, he suggests that what makes language function is not its logical form, but "form of life".Viewing "form of life" as the key concept of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, and in the viewpoint that "form of life is the basis of language use", this thesis attempts to understand Wittgenstein’s "private language argument", and to understand his philosophical work Philosophical Investigations, and to refute some arguments which are not in line with Wittgenstein’s idea.Questions about the relationships between language, thought, and reality preoccupied Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical career. Wittgenstein’s philosophical life may be divided into two phases: an early period, represented by Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; and a later period, represented by Philosophical Investigations. Chapter One briefly introduces Wittgenstein’s life as well as his philosophical developments. Also domestic and overseas studies of Wittgenstein are briefly reviewed.Chapter Two is mainly to clarify some important notions in Philosophical Investigations. Language-games are human activities; ostensive definition requires preparations; and the idea of family resemblances suggests that concepts do not necessarily require a definite essence. In addition, a brief survey is made to introduce Wittgenstein’s perspective on philosophy. For Wittgenstein, philosophy is not for making suppositions; rather he views philosophy as a therapy to philosophical diseases.Chapter Three presents and discusses the problem of rule-following. Discussions will first be made on the paradox of rules, then on rules and understanding. Wittgenstein says that "it is not possible to obey a rule ’privately’", hence rule-following is public. Concerning the publicity of rule-following, the paper focuses on the disputes between Malcolm on the one hand and Baker and Hacker on the other hand, pointing out that "form of life" is the basis of rule-following and language use.Chapter Four further discusses and ascertains the impossibility of private language. The concept of private language will be introduced, followed by the discussion of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, including the pain behavior, private sensation diary, and memory skepticism. Finally, Kripke’s skepticism and skeptical solution, as well as his community view will be discussed. Kripke does not discuss rules, understanding and private language problem from the diversity of form of life, therefore his interpretation is too narrow."Wittgenstein’s skeptical solution is of great enlightening significance. He does not oppose the ideas which deem language to be a rule representational system, nor does he oppose the possibility to describe language rules. In fact, what Wittgenstein really wants to say is that in so doing one is often led to misunderstanding, and it has indeed resulted in misunderstanding! It makes people forget what really makes language work." What Wittgenstein emphasizes is that language meaning is closely related to language-games. Discussions on language rules are meaningless if it were digressed from ordinary life, broke away from the community of human life, and from specific language practices. Therefore, what Wittgenstein advocates is to return to the philosophy of ordinary life, "back to the rough ground", and back to the form of life.This thesis does not make explanations on what is a form of life, because it is a large and evasive concept which lacks fixed boundaries and fixed nature, and is constantly in flux. Moreover, the language we use in accordance with the form of life has no "essence" which enables us to grasp the nature of the form of life, all at a time. What we can do is to describe because "Philosophy really is ’purely descriptive’." So long as this is endless, the philosophical battlements will be endless.