Defending The Reliability Of Transparent Inferences

Transparent Inferences refers to typical psychological transitions from a belief that p to a belief that one believes that p,with the intention of explaining self-ascriptions of beliefs.Transparent Inferences is faced with several objections:first,it is not consistent with the form of inductive and deductive reasoning,and it is easy to fall into the mire of non-standard form;second,Transparent Inferences does not require self-belief to be true,which is inconsistent with Boyle’s reflective endorsement;third,it is inconsistent with Williamson’s way of explaining self-ascriptions of beliefs.Transparent Inferences is a method of transitions between beliefs,not a traditional reasoning.Whether it conforms to inductive and deductive reasoning forms is not the same as whether it is reliable.The central point of Boyle and Williamson is that explaining self-ascriptions of beliefs requires examining whether the belief is true and consistent with the external world or not.However,the question of self-ascriptions of beliefs is a "theoretical" question,and the answer to this question requires thinking about why the belief was acquired,rather than proving the belief to be true.In the face of these objections,scholars in favor of Transparent Inferences try to justify it by Reliabilism and the self-verifying Transparent Inferences.Reliabilism can be divided into Inferential Reliabilism and Evidential Reliabilism:the former appeals to the reliability of the belief transformation process;the latter appeals to the reliability of the connections between beliefs.According to a common understanding of the reasons for beliefs,Evidential Reliabilism is more convincing.However,Evidential Reliabilism equates the question that why a person believes that he believes p with the question whether the belief is true or not,and replaces the "theoretical" question with the"practical" question,which deviates from the explanatory path of Transparent Inferences.Byrne no longer tries to find evidence to justify Transparent Inferences.He points out that Transparent Inferences is self-verifying and ensures that the subject self-ascribe the belief through privileged access.This paper argues that the defense of Transparent Inferences does not explain how the subject achieves the transitions of belief,nor does it guarantee that a belief that p is transformed into a belief that one believes that p.To explain the self-ascriptions of beliefs we should not only justify Reliabilism and self-verifying Transparent Inferences,but also prove that Transparent Inferences is a reliable method of transitions between beliefs.The demonstration of Transparent Inferences’ reliability involves two levels:the first is to guarantee the subject’s reflection to belief p from the path;The second is to ensure the transmission of belief within the subject from the mechanism.The previous defense of Transparent Inferences only focuses on the process of transitions and the evidential relationship between beliefs,neglects the access and mechanism of how to achieve transitions between beliefs,and lacks a strong demonstration of the reliability of transitions between beliefs.