The Issue Of Arms Sales To Taiwan During The Negotiations On Sino-US Normalization

Arms sales to Taiwan is an unsolved issue left over from history in the negotiations on Sino-US normalization.This paper aims to reconstruct the process and details of the negotiations on arms sales to Taiwan during the Sino-America normalization negotiation through the analysis of historical archives and materials,and to explore the nature of the shelving of arms sales to Taiwan in the negotiations.Even before Kissinger’s visit to China,the administration was scrambling to find an alternative to US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty(Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and China)that would guarantee the island’s security after normalization.ChinaUS relations have made a breakthrough since the declaration of the Shanghai Communique,however,America has always been reluctant to give up its security and defense commitments to Taiwan,and has even replaced direct military aid with arms sales credit,thus obtaining a substantial increase in aid to Taiwan.During his 1973 meeting with Kissinger,Zhou Enlai was concerned about new changes in US-Taiwan joint production of the F-5E,but the two sides failed to discuss the issue in depth.Solomon first proposed linking the China’s declaration on the peaceful liberation of Taiwan to the abandonment of the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty,continuing to sell military weapons to Taiwan,providing a new way to deal with US-Taiwan defense relation,but changes in the internal affairs of China and the United States in 1974 halted the normalization effort.After taking office,President Ford confirmed the policy basis of “Taiwan’s limited access to new weapons” and promised to break off US-Taiwan relations on the Japanese Formula.In 1976,China and the United States underwent a change of leadership and normalization was put back on the agenda.PRM-24 provides the Carter administration with a preliminary plan to maintain full economic relations with Taiwan after normalization,including the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan.After Vance’s visit to China,the Carter administration further finalized the “double insurance” package of arms sales to Taiwan based on the U.S.Formula,hoping to obtain China’s statement not to refute the U.S.’s unilateral peaceful intentions on the Taiwan question and China’s explicit or implied agreement on the arms package.During Brzezinski’s visit,he coined phrases such as “historic transition” and “full range of commercial relations” and unjustifiably interpreted the “no responding” of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng as tacit Chinese acquiescence to the arms sales.The Carter administration eventually established a limited policy of relaxing China’s declaration of peaceful intentions while negotiating with China on arms sales and selling limited new weapons.Before the formal negotiations on diplomatic relations,except for Carter who advocated directly raising the issue of arms sales,others all favored an indirect approach.Woodcock,as the U.S.negotiator,also believed that the issue of arms sales could not be directly put on the negotiating table,but China has made it clear that it opposes arms sales to the United States and Taiwan as a basic position even before the formal negotiations.After four rounds of talks,Woodcock acknowledged that arms sales to Taiwan was a difficult issue but said there was still room for negotiation,and the Chinese blamed the lack of agreement on arms sales for the lack of substantive progress.On September 19,1978,Carter directly raised the position of continuing arms sales to Taiwan when meeting with Chai Zemin.At this point,Carter decided to make concessions,expecting only implicit Chinese approval on the issue of arms sales,and offered to suggest the two sides speed up the pace of normalization,while Deng Xiaoping also gave instructions to seize the opportunity to complete the normalization as soon as possible and accelerate the negotiation process.On December 4,Mr.Han told Woodcock that he strongly opposed continued U.S.arms sales to Taiwan after normalization,but the Carter administration continued to interpret that as a “De facto acceptance.” At the last minute of the diplomatic talks,the two sides’ differences over arms sales to Taiwan were fully exposed on the negotiating table.The Chinese side demanded that the United States stop arms sales to Taiwan forever after 1980,while the United States understood that it stopped sales for only one year in 1979.At a critical moment in history when the future of normalization was uncertain,Deng Xiaoping,with his eyes on the larger picture,seizing the momentum,decided to accept Woodcock’s proposal to put aside differences over arms sales,thus realizing the normalization of bilateral relations and opening a new chapter in China-US relations.The two sides put aside their differences to achieve normalization mainly based on four considerations.First,the change of international political pattern reshaped the interest relationship between actors.The expansion of the Soviet Union in the third world posed a common threat to both China and the United States.Second,changes in internal affairs affected foreign policy,and political changes in China made it necessary for Deng Xiaoping to win a diplomatic victory quickly,especially in relations with the United States.Third,China is carrying out economic modernization reform,and it is in urgent need of a good international environment,as well as technical support from the United States.Fourth,the shelving of the arms issue is an attempt to make separate arrangements for Taiwan in the future.In any case,the leaders of both sides have shown great political wisdom in shelving small issues in the face of big ones.However,arms sales to Taiwan have continued as a legacy of the negotiations for diplomatic ties,interacting with China-US relations.