A Study Of The "Trendelenburg’s Gap" In Kant’s Philosophy

The German philosopher Kant put forward a transcendental view of time and space in "Critique of Pure Reason" in 1781,and regarded time and space as a priori form of human sensible intuition.Nearly a hundred years later,Trendelenburg questioned Kant’s transcendental view of space-time.He believed that Kant ignored the possibility that space is both a priori form of human sensible intuition and objective attribute of thing in itself.The domestic academic circles are accustomed to refer to it as the "Trandelenburg’s Gap." As soon as Trendelenburg’s question was raised,it immediately attracted widespread attention from the Kant academic circle at that time,and many scholars rushed to participate in the debate on the "Gap" issue.However,due to the complex system of Kant’s philosophy,the obscure language,and the different perspectives of scholars on Kant’s transcendental idealism from different positions,the debate on this issue has not yet reached a unified conclusion.The first part of this thesis examines the context of the text in which Trendelenburg is questioning.In his debate with Fisher,he restores the philosophical approach in which the problem occurred.Trendelenburg is not just refuting in the sense of textual evidence.Kant opposed it out of the need to construct his own philosophy of movement.In the second part of this thesis,we return to Kant’s proof of exclusive subjectivity of time and space.Although there are some objections in the argument of "transcendental aesthetic",Kant’s approach to clarify the characteristics of time and space is coherent.In the third part of this thesis,it is noted that objections similar to Trendelenburg’s question were raised at the same time as Kant.Although Kant was not directly mentioned in the "Critique of Pure Reason",letters with friends in the previous critical period,As well as the refutation of Eberhard during the critical period,the possibility of objectivity in time and space was denied.Therefore,we have reason to believe that Kant did not ignore this possibility,but consciously rejected it.The fourth part of this thesis attempts to examine the Trandelenburg’s gap as a whole.On the one hand,within Kant’s philosophy,"Critique of Pure Reason" did not pay too much attention to and discussed this possibility for the main purpose of "transcendental topic",but this is incompatible with the transcendental idealism itself.On the other hand,when we jumped out of the perspective of Kant’s philosophy,Trendelenburg’s doubts still exist,and the disputes between transcendental idealism and scientific realism on space-time views are far from over.