Research On The Motivation Of Bidirectional Funds Occupation And Economic Consequences Of Listed Companies

In modern society,with the continuous improvement of the corporate governanc e structure,the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholders and other sma ll and medium-sized shareholders is also intensifying,and the core of its principal-age nt problem has also undergone a series of changes.In recent years,the behaviors of "Tunneling" and "Propping",are the classic description of corporate governance under this transformation.In short,while the controlling shareholders occupy the resources of the listed company,there is also the problem of the listed company occupying the funds of the controlling shareholders,that is,there is a situation of two-way occupation of funds.The former is a means for controlling shareholders to "Tunneling" listed companies,while the latter can be understood as a way for controlling shareholders to "Propping" listed companies.Because of the controlling shareholder’s extremely advantageous control position,it has sufficient motivation and ability to implement two-way fund occupation for the maximization of personal interests.However,most of the existing literature focuses on the research of "tunneling",a one-way benefit transmission channel,while the research of "support" behavior is relatively small,especially the research of combining the two.Therefore,it is of practical significance to combine the two to study the motivation and economic consequences of two-way fund occupation through specific cases.Therefore,this paper first sorts out and summarizes the literature at home and ab road in order to find a foothold.Secondly,through the use of statistical analysis,case analysis and qualitative analysis,combined with three theories of principal-agent,information asymmetry and private benefits of control.JIDONG CEMENTT was selected as the case study object because after consulting the relevant literature,the22 accounts receivable and payable in the related party transactions disclosed in the annual report were used as the indicator to measure the two-way capital occupation,and the difference between the accounts receivable and payable was used as the net capital occupation.When the difference was positive,it reflected the "Tunneling" effect at this time,while when the difference was negative,it reflected the "Propping" effect,However,JIDONG CEMENTT is in line with this indicator during 2011-2020.The difference is positive in the first five years and negative in the last five years.The statistical results are strongly related to the research in this paper.Then by introducing the institutional background and the current situation of the industry of two-way capital occupation,we find that this phenomenon occurs most frequently in the manufacturing industry.Finally,by studying the causes and economic consequences of the two-way capital occupation behavior of the controlling shareholders of JIDONG CEMENTT,we draw conclusions from it,and provide some thoughts from the perspectives of institutional constraints,protection mechanisms and external supervision,so that they can correctly and reasonably treat the concept of two-way capital occupation,so as to prevent delisting risks,improve the company’s value,and optimize the allocation of resources,Promote the healthy development of China’s capital market.To sum up,this paper draws the analysis conclusion: on the one hand,the two-way capital occupation behavior of the controlling shareholders of listed companies is actually to maximize their own interests in the final analysis.When the profitability is good,the growth is high or the risk level is low,the intrinsic value created by the listed company will also be higher.At this time,the controlling shareholders may support the listed company when they believe that the shared income obtained by "Propping" the listed company is greater than the private income obtained by "Tunneling" the listed company.When the profitability of listed companies deteriorates,the ability to grow in the future is not high or the degree of risk is high,and the controlling shareholders believe that the private benefits that can be obtained by "Tunneling" listed companies are greater than the shared benefits that can be obtained by "Propping" listed companies,the controlling shareholders have the possibility of "Tunneling" listed companies.On the other hand,two-way capital occupation is actually a "double-edged sword",When the "Propping" effect is reflected,the performance of listed companies will be improved,and it will also bring confidence to investors.When the "Tunneling" effect is more obvious,the effect is opposite.Therefore,based on the research conclusions of this paper,the following suggestions are put forward: First,the regulatory authorities should strengthen institutional constraints and define the administrative responsibility of the controlling shareholders for occupying funds;The second is to effectively improve the convenience of minority shareholders in exercising their rights,improve and standardize related party transactions,and protect the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders;The third is to strengthen the regulatory environment,strengthen the timeliness and authenticity of information disclosure,make good use of the supervisory role of external public opinion,and improve the problems caused by market information asymmetry.