Research On The Influencing Factors And Evolutionary Game Of Governmental Cross-sectoral Collaboration To Prevent And Govern Pollution Behavior

With the rapid development of economy and society,the problem of environmental pollution is becoming more and more serious.It has a wide range of influence and a strong destructive power.At the present stage,the inter-departmental cooperation of government has become the main mode of environmental pollution prevention and governance.However,there are still many problems in the process of collaborative prevention and governance of environmental pollution by government departments.When government departments choose the strategy of collaborative prevention and governance behavior,they will consider the cost and benefit,and when the cost of collaborative prevention and governance of government departments is greater than the benefit,they are less motivated to collaborate and governance,and tend to adopt weak collaborative strategies,resulting in low efficiency of collaborative prevention and governance.How to optimize the strategy of collaborative prevention and governance behavior and efficiently promote the collaborative prevention and governance of environmental pollution by the government is an urgent problem to be solved.This study takes the government departments involved in environmental pollution prevention and governance as the research object,and integrates social network analysis,empirical analysis,and evolutionary game analysis to study the optimization of the government’s interdepartmental collaborative environmental pollution prevention and governance behavior,with the aim of promoting environmental pollution prevention and governance in an efficient and orderly manner,as follows:First,we identify the influencing factors of governmental interdepartmental cooperation in preventing and governing environmental pollution,construct a theoretical model of the influencing factors of governmental interdepartmental cooperation in preventing and governing environmental pollution,and analyze the correlation of the influencing factors of governmental interdepartmental cooperation in preventing and governing environmental pollution.An empirical study is conducted to investigate the governmental cross-sectoral cooperation in preventing and governing environmental pollution,to propose hypotheses,and to construct a structural equation model to analyze the correlations among the influencing factors and the influence of each factor on the governmental cross-sectoral cooperation in preventing and governing environmental pollution.The results of the empirical study show that policy and regulations,common perception,perceived usefulness,and perceived risk all have significant effects on governmental collaborative prevention and governance behaviors,among which policy and regulations have the greatest influence and are the key influencing factors.Secondly,the evolutionary game model between core and auxiliary departments is constructed to study the behavioral strategy choices between government departments,and the behavioral strategy choices between core and auxiliary departments are obtained under four different scenarios,and it is found that the positive degree of government departments’ cooperative environmental pollution prevention and governance behavior is closely related to the cost and benefit of cooperative prevention and governance,and the policy constraint mechanism can restrain the government departments’ cooperative environmental pollution prevention and governance behavior and promote the government departments to adopt more effective cooperative prevention and governance behavior strategies.Finally,the game relationship of collaborative soil pollution prevention and governance behaviors is simulated and analyzed by taking Wuhan City,Hubei Province,as an example.According to the implementation plan of soil pollution prevention and governance in Wuhan city,the government departments involved in the collaboration are identified,and the social network analysis method is used to construct the government interdepartmental collaboration prevention and governance network,identify the evolutionary game subjects with different influences,identify the core and auxiliary departments,and conduct the simulation analysis and sensitivity analysis of the evolutionary game model.The results of the simulation model show that the core and auxiliary departments have different tendencies to choose the strategy of collaborative prevention and governance behavior,and the core departments are more likely to choose the strong collaborative strategy,while the auxiliary departments are more likely to choose the weak collaborative strategy when the policy constraints are weak.Based on the evolutionary game model and simulation,policy recommendations are proposed to promote the efficiency of governmental cross-sectoral collaborative environmental pollution prevention and governance.