Coupling Coordination And Evolutionary Game Of Green Technology Innovation,green Production,and Green Consumption

Since the reform and opening up,China’s economy has developed rapidly and people’s living standards have continuously improved.However,with it,environmental pollution has become increasingly serious,posing a threat to public health.Therefore,in order to solve the problem of environmental pollution,green development has gradually become the main theme of national development,and has also become a focus of research by relevant scholars.As an important component of the green development system,studying the relationship between the green technology innovation subsystem,green production subsystem,and green consumption subsystem,as well as the conflicts of interests between relevant entities,is an important means to solve the current environmental pollution problem.However,the relationship between the three subsystems is complex,and implementing green technology innovation and adopting green production strategies will increase the production costs of enterprises and reduce their enthusiasm for green transformation and upgrading.The green consumption level of consumers is influenced by various factors,and the implementation of environmental regulations by the government will increase the government’s costs,Therefore,it is worth studying how to coordinate the relationship between the three subsystems and how to select relevant entities to achieve the overall optimization of the system.However,current research mostly focuses on the relationship between a single subsystem or two subsystems,and there is less research on the impact of different strategies chosen by relevant entities on other entities.In summary,in order to accelerate the process of green development and improve the level of green development,this article first establishes a coupling and coordination system for green technology innovation,green production,and green consumption.Taking 18 cities in Henan Province as research objects,the entropy method and coupling coordination degree model are used to analyze the coupling and coordination development level among the three subsystems,and corresponding suggestions are proposed for the coordinated development of the three subsystems in Henan Province.Then,based on the entities involved in the three subsystems,a tripartite evolutionary game model is established for enterprises,government,and consumers.The potential gains and losses generated by the implementation of different strategies by the government and enterprises are introduced into the evolutionary game model,and the stability of the respective strategies of the three parties and the equilibrium point of the tripartite evolutionary game are analyzed.Finally,using system dynamics methods,dynamic simulation is conducted on the parameters in the game model to study the impact of key parameters on the game results,in order to propose effective suggestions for promoting enterprise transformation and upgrading and improving consumers’ green consumption level.The research results indicate that:(1)The development of green technology innovation in Henan Province is relatively unbalanced,with significant regional differences.The development of green production and green consumption is relatively balanced,but the overall level of the two systems is not high.(2)The development performance of coupling coordination degree varies among different cities,and by2020,some cities were still in a mild imbalance stage of coordination degree,with significant differences in coordination degree levels between cities;The coupling level space shows high in the middle and low at both ends,while the co scheduling level is high in the middle and low around,and the overall level is not high.(3)When the stability conditions of the dominant strategy are met,regardless of the initial intentions of the three parties,the final stability strategy is for enterprises to choose green technology innovation and green production,government to choose regulation,and consumers to choose purchasing strategies.(4)The willingness of enterprises to choose green technology innovation and green production is positively correlated with the subsidies and potential benefits they receive,while the willingness of government regulation is negatively correlated with regulatory costs.When the regulatory costs of the government exceed 6(relative value),the government will gradually shift from a regulatory strategy to an unregulated strategy due to high costs.The willingness of consumers to purchase is positively correlated with the psychological utility they receive when purchasing green products,And the willingness to purchase is influenced by companies and the government.