| With the continuous development of China’s securities market,listed companies frequently introduce the dividend distribution policy of "high transfer".The "high transfer" was originally a way for listed companies to "reward" investors,but in recent years,the "high transfer" of listed companies has not only become more and more intense,but also behind the The "high giveaway" of listed companies in recent years has not only intensified,but also behind such illegal acts as insider trading,information collusion manipulation and benefit transfer.At the same time,some listed companies’ high giveaway,there is also the suspicion of chasing market hotspots and catering to market speculation.The "high transfer" is essentially to convey the company’s ideal business performance to investors,so as to absorb more investment,but the "high transfer" does not achieve this function,but has been reduced to a means for major shareholders to reduce their stock holdings to cash out.On January 7,2016,the Securities and Futures Commission(SFC)issued "Certain Regulations on Shareholding Reduction by Major Shareholders,Directors and Supervisors of Listed Enterprises" to regulate the reduction of shareholding,followed by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE)on May 27,2017,which issued "Certain Regulations on Shareholding Reduction by Shareholders,Directors and Supervisors of Listed Enterprises" to regulate the reduction of shareholding by major shareholders.On May27,2017,the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE)issued "Certain Regulations on Shareholding Reduction by Shareholders,Directors and Supervisors of Listed Companies" to further restrict the disorderly shareholding reduction by major shareholders.In this paper,we use case studies,literature research and quantitative analysis to study the "high giveaway" situation,the motivation of major shareholders to reduce their holdings,and the impact of the "high giveaway".The article firstly defines the concept of "high transfer",explains information asymmetry,catering theory,shareholding structure and other related theories,and analyzes the current situation of major shareholders’ shareholding reduction;secondly,the basic situation,shareholding structure and major shareholders’ shareholding reduction are explained;and then the major shareholders’ use of "high transfer" to take advantage of the "high transfer" is discussed.The motivation of the major shareholder’s shareholding reduction is analyzed from the aspects of "high transfer" to get cash,single shareholding structure of the company,catering to the irrational demand of investors and cooperating with the major shareholder’s shareholding reduction of unblocked shares,etc.Finally,the analysis of "high transfer" in the context of the enterprise,capital market and investors Finally,it analyzes the impact of large shareholders’ shareholding reduction in the context of "high transfer" from three aspects: enterprises,capital market and investors.The research results of the article show that this major shareholder’s shareholding reduction is a kind of uncompromising benefit transfer behavior,and its behavior has produced adverse effects on all aspects.In view of the adverse effects produced,this article puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspectives of company managers and market regulators respectively: optimize the shareholding structure of listed companies and choose a reasonable dividend distribution policy;improve the information disclosure system to reduce the impact of information asymmetry;strengthen the supervision and management of the capital market to prevent large shareholders from reducing their holdings in the case of poor performance;improve relevant laws and regulations,and protect the interests of small and medium shareholders The study of this paper is intended to provide a better understanding of the impact of information symmetry.Through the research of this paper,we hope to provide useful reference for how to formulate reasonable dividend distribution policy to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors,and also hope to further supplement the theoretical research on improving the analysis of the impact of shareholding reduction by large shareholders of listed companies. |