Research On Low-carbon Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Altruistic Preference Under Different Power Structures

The massive emission of greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities and economic development has had a negative impact on the environment.It has become the consensus of the international community to reduce carbon emissions and realize the coordinated development of economy and environment.In response to the policy call,many enterprises began to actively explore the path of low-carbon economic development,and a low-carbon supply chain came into being.However,decision-makers in the real-world business environment exhibit altruistic preference behaviors,and it has been proven that altruistic preference behaviors affect the original decisions of the supply chain.At the same time,in the complex and uncertain market environment,a variety of channel power structure operation modes are gradually derived,large retailers have the right to speak,and retailer-led channel power structures other than manufacturer-led have emerged,and different channel power structures will lead to different final decisions.Therefore,this paper constructs a Stackelberg equilibrium decision model for low-carbon supply chain considering altruistic preference behavior under different power structures based on the second-level low-carbon supply chain composed of a single retailer and a single manufacturer,and compares the similarities and differences of equilibrium solutions under different power structures by considering product price and channel members’ effort level as key factors affecting market demand.The similarities and differences of equilibrium solutions under different power structures are compared.The results show that:(1)Under the three different power structures,the altruistic preference behavior of members can always prompt supply chain members to increase the level of effort input,and the level of bilateral effort always reaches the maximum when the other party is altruistic.(2)Profit per unit of product is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s altruistic preference,negatively correlated with retailer’s altruistic preference,and is the largest when retailer dominates;Wholesale prices are negatively correlated with manufacturers’ altruistic preferences,positively correlated with retailers’ altruistic preferences,and are at their greatest when manufacturers are dominant.(3)The benefits and overall benefits of supply chain members are related to altruistic preferences,and the benefits of channel members reach the highest when they are the dominant players,and the overall benefits of the supply chain are highest under the game mechanism of equal capabilities of all parties.(4)Whether under the altruistic preference of retailers or the altruistic preferences of manufacturers,the profits of supply chain members are always on the rise when they are the dominant players.(5)The total profit of the supply chain under the three power structures always increases with the increase of altruistic preference,and considering altruistic preference behavior is conducive to the improvement of supply chain performance.