Study On The Rate And Pricing Strategy Of Family Doctor Service For Two Types Of Contract Groups

Currently,China’s medical and health undertakings are faced with major challenges such as an aging population and a high incidence of chronic diseases.The implementation of the family doctor contract service system is an important measure to meet the people’s long-term and continuous demand for health care,transform the medical and health service model,balance medical resources and reasonably control medical expenses.However,in the practice of promoting the contract service of family doctors in China,due to the lack of performance incentive for family doctors and the lack of public trust in the services of community medical institutions,the phenomenon of signing rate is not high or signing but not paying attention to "quantity" rather than"quality" is widespread.Therefore,efforts should be made to improve the service of family doctors,so as to enhance the trust of the public on family doctors.According to the actual situation,this paper divides the population into two categories:one is the key population with high demand rate,such as the elderly,the young,and the chronic disease,and the other is the general population with low demand rate.From the perspective of different service modes of family doctors,the paper studied the service rate and optimal pricing of family doctor for two types of people with different demand rates under the selection behavior of two types of people with delay sensitivity.Firstly,described the family doctor service process as M/M/1 queuing system,consider the selection behavior of two groups of people with the same delay cost but different service perceived value,the queuing and game integration models were used to study the decision of family doctor service rate and the optimal prieing for the two groups of people.Four thresholds for the service rate of family doctors were found.and below a minimum threshold,family doctors would not treat any potential contractors.Along with the family doctor service rate increases,when the perceived service value of key groups is lower than that of the general population,family doctors will shift responsibility to the key groups with higher demand rate.Until the service rate of family doctors is higher than a certain threshold,family doctors will choose to serve all the contracted population,and then reach the goal of universal coverage of the contracted service system of family doctors.Then,from the perspective of family doctor’s referral service in the current"1+1+1" model,contracted residents can be referred by family doctor to superior medical institutions for medical treatment.Further,the family doctor service process under the referral system is modeled as the M/M/1 queuing model.Consider the selection behavior of two groups of people with the same delay cost but different service perceived value,a two-stage Stackelberg game model for two groups of people is established to study the competitive equilibrium between the health insurance sector with the goal of maximizing social welfare and the family doctor with the goal of maximizing income.The research shows that the reasonable price of family doctor services can effectively restrict the behavior of family doctors.The optimal upward referral rate of patients should be controlled within a certain range.Controlling the upward referral rate of patients can effectively reduce the waiting time of patients and improve the benefits of family doctors.To sum up,this paper aims at the problems such as the lack of trust from the masses and the "signing but not signing" of family doctors in the process of contracting services,takes family doctor service as the research object,studies the service rate and optimal pricing of family doctors services for two groups of people.This will provide theoretical reference for the service operation and management decision-making in the medical field,and is of great significance to give full play to the role of family doctors as gatekeepers in China’s hierarchical medical system.