| Social norms are commonly recognized behavior standards that guide individuals on how to behave in social situations,and fairness is one of the most basic social norms.Previous research has found that when someone violates the norm of fairness,third-parties who are not involved in the event are willing to punish the violator at a cost to themselves,which means third-party punishment.This behavior is widespread in human societies.Although third-party punishment can lead to economic costs for the punishers,many studies have shown that it can bring reputational benefits,and therefore people tend to allocate more money to third-party punishers,demonstrating an allocation advantage compared with third-party non-punishers.Researchers have different explanations for how others perceive the reputation of thirdparty punishers.The indirect reciprocity theory suggests that people tend to allocate more resources to third-party punishers than to third-party non-punishers,because punishment can establish a good prosocial reputation.On the other hand,the deterrence theory suggests that people are more generous in money allocation to third-party punishers because they fear deterrence from them.Thus,this study aims to first determine whether the reputation of thirdparty punishers perceived by people is prosocial or based on deterrence.Based on this,the study further examines whether people’s allocation behavior towards third-parties is due to the punishers establishing a better reputation,or third-party non-punishers receiving a worse reputation,or both.Finally,the study explores whether people’s allocation to third-parties is influenced by the third-party punishment intentions and actual results,as well as the role of reputation in this process.Study 1 designed two experiments based on previous research and used different economic game tasks to investigate the reputation of third-party punishers perceived by proposers during money allocation with third-party punishers.First,in Study 1a,participants observed a thirdparty interaction where the first-parties proposed allocation plans to the second-parties,and the third-parties decided whether to punish the first-parties who made an unfair distribution.Then,the participants acted as proposers and allocated money to previous third-party punishers or non-punishers in the Dictator Game(DG)and the Ultimatum Game(UG).In the DG,the thirdparties have no right to reject an unfair distribution,and the deterrence effect is low.In contrast,in the UG,the third-parties can reject an unfair distribution,and the deterrence effect is high.By comparing the allocation of proposers in the two tasks,the results showed that proposers demonstrated an allocation advantage to third-party punishers in all tasks,and this effect did not diminish when controlling for the third-parties’ rejection power,indicating that the allocation advantage for third-party punishers was not derived from the deterrent reputation.In Study 1b,the study added a prosocial reputation evaluation of previous third-parties after the experiment,further verifying the role of prosocial reputation in proposers’ fair feedback to third-parties.The results showed that third-party punishers received higher prosocial reputation evaluations than non-punishers,and third-party behavior type and allocation were also mediated by prosocial reputation.Based on Study 1,Study 2 aims to answer whether the allocation advantage to third-party punishers is due to positive reciprocity,resulting from the third-party punishers gaining better reputation,or negative reciprocity,resulting from the third-party non-punishers receiving worse reputation,or both.A baseline condition is introduced in Study 2 where the behavior of the third-parties are unknown.By comparing proposers’ allocations and reputation evaluations towards third-party punishers and non-punishers with the baseline condition,the indirect reciprocity direction towards previous third-party punishers and non-punishers is explored.The results show that proposers give more allocations to third-party punishers who explicitly punish,and less to third-party non-punishers,indicating that the allocation advantage to punishers over non-punishers is a result of both positive and negative reciprocity.The allocation advantage towards third-party punishers is based on the improvement of prosocial reputation.Finally,previous research has not fully considered the third-party behavior intentions and outcomes in money allocation.This study aimed to separate the third-party behavior intentions and outcomes by introducing a computer system to modify the third-party decision-making setting.The results showed that proposers allocated more money to third-party punishers than non-punishers when the third-parties exhibited punishment intentions or implemented punishment outcomes.However,proposers only gave higher prosocial evaluations to thirdparties who exhibited punishment intentions,even when there was a discrepancy between punishment intentions and actual outcomes,and punishment intention were sufficient to support third-parties’ acquisition of prosocial reputations,which partially mediated the impact of thirdparty intention type on proposers’ allocation.In summary,the allocation advantage of proposers towards third-party punishers,relative to non-punishers,is based on the prosocial reputation released by punishers rather than the deterrent reputation,which is grounded in judgments of punishment intentions and this prosocial reputation ultimately leads to proposers allocating more money to third-party punishers.Furthermore,the allocation advantage of proposers towards punishers,relative to non-punishers,is a result of both positive and negative reciprocity.The positive reciprocity towards third-party punishers is based on the enhancement of prosocial reputation.This study provides new evidence for the study of third-party punishment from the perspective of indirect reciprocity and helps researchers understand the social adaptability of fairness maintenance behavior. |
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