On The Price And Project Management Of Trans-basin Water Transferring Project Based On The Game Theory

Trans-basin water transferring is an effective way to solve the problem of unbalanced distribution of water resources. However, the way for trans-basin water transferring is very complicated and involves various problems so the researches on water price and project management of trans-basin water transferring system are not systematically carried out yet. Based on the characteristics of trans-basin water transferring project in the field of water conservancy, the present study uses the thought and method of the game theory to explain and analyze the phenomena appearing in the engineering management of trans-basin water transferring project.Many participants are involved in the process of implementing trans-basin water transferring project. In the present study, only those participants who are closely related to each other in interests and are of vital importance in the trans-basin water transferring project are taken into consideration including the government, the owner, the consulting engineers and the contractor. Some problems are discussed such as the water price in transferring project; agreements; conspiracy; bids and the development of companies. Some theoretical methods and ways for solving those problems are proposed in this study.Based on the analysis of present studies on related questions, the following espects are researched in this study:(1) On the basis of the principle of setting the water price in trans-basin water transferring project, the dynamic game theory model of complete information is applied to analyze the interests of the water suppliers and consumers' degree of satisfaction so as to reach the Nash Equilibrium between the water price established by the government and the price estimated by suppliers. This balance can not only fulfill the water suppliers' need of certain profit but also satisfy the acceptability of the public. The results of the analysis are testified through analyzing and calculating the comprehensive water price of project, water price of project and consumers' acceptable water price.(2) On the foundation of the agency by agreement theory, how to balance the interests of owners and contractors through game theory, when both sides are trying to maximize their gain before and after they sign the contract and when the contract is in effect, is analyzed separately. First of all, based on the Bayes theorem of defective information dynamic game theory, how the owners adopt certain strategies to select one contractor with high quality when they invite bids is discussed. Secondly, based on the dynamic Nash Equilibrium in game theory of complete and perfect information, how the owners take strategies to preserve their interests when the contractors who have signed the contact are not qualified is also analyzed. Finally, according to the agency by agreement in the game theory, the encouragement-restraint model is established during the time when contractors are executing the contract. Therefore, the contractors' best degree of efforts is coefficient with the encouragement of owners, which is very important for guiding owners' to design the encouragement-restraint contract and enhancing contractors' degree of efforts.(3) Between the owner and consulting engineer, the model of determined agency by agreement with regular remuneration in the game theory is discussed at first. The consulting companies do not undertake any risk of the project and their income is stable and not tied to risk basically. Consequently they will become irresponsible and slack in work during the consulting process. Secondly, the model of agency by agreement with uncertain remuneration in the game theory (the dominant incentive mechanism) is analyzed. Since the consulting companies have to undertake part of the risks and get rewards accordingly, they will be motivated to work harder in managing the project and it can reduce their irresponsibility. Finally, at present the domestic consulting engineers often sign the contract to get regular remuneration and the consulting market has been established, which is just the reputation model (recessive incentive mechanism). Therefore, through the repeated analysis of the agent's market and reputation model by game theory, it is testified to be possible for the consulting companies to fulfill their duty at work even though they are not offered the dominant incentive because they should consider their interests in a long-term and try to improve their image in the eyes of owners and others in the same field and maintain their competitive advantage. Hence the recessive incentive can get an effect as same as the dominant incentive does.(4) Between the consulting engineer and the contractor, the quality monitor between consulting company and contractor is analyzed at first by the game theory in both single stage and multi-stages. According to the analysis of the model it is unavoidable for the contractors to have deceit behaviors because the quality checking work of the consulting engineer may not be fully implemented. Therefore, the consulting company can adopt advanced methods to check and strengthen the force of punishment to decrease quality problems. Secondly, because the consulting engineer and contractor are not the final beneficiary, they may intend to conspire with each other for maximizing their own interests. When the contractor dose not work hard (scamp work), they will take the initiative to plot with the consulting company, which results in their conspiracy. When the contractor work hard but the consulting company abuses their authority in order to gain extra interests for maximizing its own utility, the contractor will conspire with the consulting company so it changes from the passive one into the one taking initiative. In order to stop the behavior of conspiracy from happening, the prevention model in game theory is established. The analysis of the model shows that for the owners through introducing another supervisor and designing a mechanism like the dilemma of captive will be an effective way to make the two supervisors controlled by each other so as to prevent conspiracy.(5) During the bidding process, according to the bidding mold of "bottom price law" and "compound bid law", which are generally used in China at present, two models of bid in the game theory are established separately. The relationship between the constructing company's interests in the bid of project and the probability of winning the bid is specified in the model of the bottom price for winning in the game theory. In the compound bid model, the all-purpose model of compound bid is established for effectively forecasting the bidding price. Even though the rival's historical information is limited and there are too many competitors, the matrix model of compound bid in the game theory can also decrease the errors in bidding and the deducted points so as to deal with any uncertainty. At last, through the practical study in real project, the utility of the above-mentioned models of the game theory are testified to be a guide for bidders to make their decision.(6) According to the research on domestic consulting market and the innovation of enterprises, the evolutionary model of the game theory is established for solving the problems of lacking sincerity and trust among consulting engineers and contractors and the insufficiency of enterprise's innovative abilities. Taking the consulting market as example at first, the consulting company often send qualified consulting engineer when they are submitting a bid but the engineer they really send after winning the bid may not be qualified enough. When there is no market restriction at all, this phenomenon will evolve into two balanced results: First, everybody honors commitments-the market competition state in order; secondly, everybody does not honor commitments-unordered market competition state. If the consulting company gets punished for not fulfilling the contract every time, the consulting market will evolve into an ordered market. Secondly the independent innovation and imitative innovation behaviors of enterprises and the evolutionary law of market structure are analyzed through the evolutionary game theory. This study indicates that it will finally stabilize at equilibrium for adopting both the independent innovation strategies and imitational innovation strategy. Namely, under certain condition part of the enterprises will carry out innovation strategy while the others normally will imitate them. And meanwhile, the investment probability of those enterprises implementing independent innovation strategy is in direct ratio to the scale of the enterprises and risk of innovation, but it is in inverse ratio to the cost for innovation.