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Studies On Incentives And Constraints Of The Chinese SOEs’Executive In Transition

Posted on:2015-08-11Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:T G Y SiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1109330434959400Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Incentive issue has been the subject and difficult problem in enterprise development, and executive incentive problem in state-owned enterprise,which is a pillar of our national economy, is full of particularity and complexity. In China in the process from a planned economy to a market economy, the state-owned enterprise incentive problems are both key issues in the reform process, but also the difficult problems. If the incentive problems can be effectively solved, it will not only effectively promote the improvement of the corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises, but also enhance the competitiveness of state-owned enterprises, and strengthen the dominant position of state-owned enterprises in the economy.Under the current special background ownership structure of state-owned enterprises, executives must be given reasonable economic incentives to promote state-owned enterprise executives of state-owned enterprises to treat operational efficiency and competitiveness as the main objective, to achieve incentive compatibility and reduce the agency costs. Due to difficulties in measurement and information asymmetry, incentives for executives of state-owned enterprises is difficult to achieve the desired results, and there is a phenomenon of excessive or insufficient incentives. Reducing the negative effects of asymmetric information needs to improve the incentive mechanism design, place the incentives and constraints in equal importance, while in preventing "internal control", giving the state-owned enterprise executives autonomy and reasonable economic incentives. Based on the theoretical analysis, combined with the international practice of state-owned enterprises and regulatory incentives,this paper analyses Chinese state-owned enterprise reform and incentive practice in detail. State-owned enterprises should be based on different attributes, implement various incentives; while strengthening economic incentives, stresses beyond economic incentives; incentives should focus on timeliness, both on short-term incentives, and long-term incentives; executives of state-owned enterprises incentives need to reflect the fairness and efficiency of unity; SOE executive pay restraint should be placed under a unified framework, and so on. This paper argues that to improve the incentive mechanism design of Chinese state-owned enterprises is a systematic project, which needs to optimize the system and institutional environment, in order to achieve significant results.From a logical view point and the general idea of the study, the text adopted the analysis of ideas from theory to practice, history to the reality, foreign to domestic, institutional and institutional environment combining. SOE executives in the economic incentive (incentive compensation) mechanism design does not stop at the level of executive pay, executive compensation and corporate performance analysis and correlation strength size, but will focus on addressing the process of state-owned enterprise executives incentive the mechanism design problems. This Paper reviewed related corporate incentive theory and motivation validity empirical research, analyzed the history and current status of Chinese state-owned enterprises pay system, the Chinese state-owned enterprises and international comparisons regulatory regime,and proposed a general idea of incentives designed building the institutional environment of state-owned enterprises incentives. In addition to guiding implication, the text is divided into six chapters, the overall structure is:Chapter one is summary of theory corporate incentives. This chapter madecommentary on the theory of production and distribution theory, motivation theory based on contributions, residual claim theory and incentive theory, which provides a theoretical source for analysis of full-text analysis. Analysis in this chapter show that the marginal productivity theory of classical economics, represented by elements of the contribution theory to explain the limited capacity of the inextricable link between wages and profits. Therefore, in the design of incentives, it not only need to give executives a fixed salary, but some residual claims,to improve the overall performance of the enterprise operation.Chapter two is about principal-agent theory and executive incentive effectiveness. On the basis of the analysis of the previous chapter, this chapter analyzes the developed various incentives based on principal-agent theory theories, and academia on testing the effectiveness of international and domestic incentive executives summarized. The results showed that the principal-agent theory in the current practice of corporate incentive not once, but a dynamic process. On this basis, the internal control and the current manager of power theory is analyzed. In the interests of a consistent overall business situation, due to the properties of the different internal power conflict of interest, There is need to be regulated from the perspective of agency costs and guarantee fees.Chapter three is on Chinese state-owned enterprise reform in executive incentive. It mainly from the history and current status of China’s state-owned enterprises pay system, analyzes the efficiency and weakness of incentive arrangements of fixed salary, annual salary system and equity incentives. Currently the "basic salary+performance pay" structure of state-owned enterprises has its rationality, and the key is how to define the relationship with performance. This article also believes that executives in state-owned enterprises enjoy the same non-economic incentives, economic incentives and mutually reinforcing, rather than replace for each other.Chapter four is about reform of state-owned corporate governance structure and compensation system. This paper argues that the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise executives incentives and regulatory regime implemented a strong correlation. Regulatory effectiveness depends to some extent on the motives and objectives of regulation, based on the state-owned enterprises discussion related to control theory, international regulatory models were compared, and the game between the regulatory bodies of was also analyzed. Combined with state-owned enterprises changes in the regulatory regime, course of the foundation of the SASAC supervision, the achievements and shortcomings were discussed, and future regulatory trends was demonstrated.Chapter five is on SOE executives incentive system environment. This chapter analysis from the governance structure of state-owned enterprises reform, fairness and efficiency-oriented ideology and legal environment for the construction of three levels discussed separately, and showed that establishing and improving the state-owned enterprise executives incentive and restraint mechanism is a process, the overall advancement of state-owned enterprises reform and the increasingly improved corporate governance structure has a strong association,and should establish a "arm’s-length" of the Board to deal with possible the "internal control" problem. This chapter also analyzes the different state-owned enterprise executives, as well as state-owned enterprises huge pay gap between executives and government officials in proposed allocation process, which not only should be to ensure efficiency, but distributive justice embodied. For lack of executive pay during the formulation of the legal aspects, there is need to be improved by strengthening corporate governance.Chapter six is of the general idea designed for the state-owned enterprise executives incentives. SOE incentive is a systematic project, involving a broader, mechanism design with some difficulty, which can only be a Pareto improvement process. Mandatory system change and induced institutional change needs to be combined, In the overall idea of incentives designed, on the basis of discussion on the state-owned enterprise executives incentive-oriented design, the incentive set design, incentive strength design, sustainable design and conduct incentive, this paper proposed incentive ideas to build a fair and competitive SOE executives.
Keywords/Search Tags:Transition Period, State-owned enterprises, Executive incentivemechanism design, Internal control, Fairness and efficiency
PDF Full Text Request
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