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A Study On The Knowledge Governance Of Industrial Clusters

Posted on:2016-09-26Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z L FeiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1109330482475124Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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The current situation and the demand of China’s industrial development, as well as inadequate existing theoretical research, brings new challenges to research on knowledge and governance of industrial clusters, and leads to the research topic of "cluster knowledge governance". Research of cluster knowledge governance is based on the traditional study of cluster knowledge issues, and unfolds study on the organization and coordination issues of cluster knowledge. Governance mechanisms for organizing and coordinating the cluster knowledge activities are the core issues of cluster knowledge governance research. The first chapter clears research questions, contents and methods. The second chapter reviews the theoretical foundation and related literature. On this basis, a theoretical framework of cluster knowledge governance mechanism is constructed. With methods of qualitative, quantitative, mathematical and case study, this dissertation expands the research on the contractual governance mechanism, the relational governance mechanism and role of government in the cluster knowledge activities. The main conclusions and findings are listed as follows:(1) Governance mechanism is the core issue of cluster knowledge governance. Cluster knowledge activities require both spontaneous organizational order of the internal network, and the constructive order from the external network, by the knowledge service institutions as well as the other stakeholders. Thus, the cluster knowledge governance mechanisms can be divided into two categories, internal governance and external governance. Internal governance is the foundation of external governance. Under certain conditions, external governance will have impacts on the internal governance. Actors of external governance could be the governance networks with various players containing government, enterprises, and the third sector. Industrial differentiation and cluster life cycle are the two factors that affect the conversion of governance actors. Regardless of external governance or internal governance, both contractual and relational governance mechanisms could be applied, to play theii complementary advantages.(2) Knowledge exchange risks exist in the processes of knowledge identification, acquisition and utilization, since cluster participants might encounter the problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and risk preference differentiation. Those risks could be coordinated through contractual governance mechanisms. To prevent adverse selection of external knowledge sources, the incentive of external knowledge sources with high-level technology-related applicability should be increased, and a higher transfer fee as well as more favorable conditions for the transfer should be provided, in the design of technology transfer contracts. To prevent moral hazard, influence from external effort and ability level of knowledge sources on the effectiveness of technology transfer should be considered. And the risk factors are determined in accordance with the relevant relationship between them. Thus a long-term incentive mechanism can be formed that output tacit knowledge to the external knowledge source effort. Based on a combination of different risk preferences, cluster actors with different attributes (such as enterprises and universities, research institutions) can choose different forms of knowledge sharing including technology transfer, R&D cooperation, entity establishment so as to improve the efficiency of knowledge sharing. If actors in the cooperation are all risk-neutral, a third party (such as the local government) might be needed to guide the formation of knowledge sharing partnerships.(3) The relational governance mechanism is more competent in adjusting the impact factors on "embeddedness" of cluster knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing activities, e.g. opportunity, motivation (willingness), shared incentives. Social interaction among innovative participants could increase opportunities of cluster knowledge transfer, while mutual trust and shared vision among participants would enhance motives of cluster knowledge transfer. When the cluster participants expect greater long-term gains in knowledge sharing process than the short-term maximum benefit with distrust choice, they will choose the trust strategy in the process of knowledge exchange, and actively share knowledge with other participants. In the process of knowledge sharing based on long-term cooperation, even if the knowledge output side has a poor reputation, in order to maximize their utility, they will choose the cooperative strategy instead of deceiving before the end of cooperation. If the trust from input side is large enough, then the output side with poor reputation will also continuously improve its reputation, thus enabling cooperative between the two sides into a virtuous cycle, and promoting the sharing of knowledge.(4) Innovative source embedded in industrial technology paradigm and proprietary with different conditions has caused differentiation of innovative activities among industries. Industries with relatively more technological opportunities, "leverage effect" from governments’direct funding is strong, then the government should play an active role in terms of R&D investment, and increase the intensity of direct funding to stimulate industrial innovative activities. While in industries with relatively less technological opportunities, the "leverage effect" is relatively weak so that the government should reduce the direct funding intensity and encourage private capital to invest in R&D activities instead. The role of government should shift from a direct investor into a financing guarantee or coordinator in innovative activities.(5) In the formation period of clusters, the local government is almost the only external governance actor in cluster knowledge activities, providing the necessary infrastructure for production and operation as well as other public goods of productive services. In the growing period, the local government’s role in the governance of cluster knowledge activities gradually weakened, and the third sector organizations or service providers from the market have gradually begun to participate in the governance of cluster knowledge activities, providing knowledge infrastructure, technology services and other public goods for the cluster participants. In the maturity period, the local government and other cluster participants jointly govern cluster knowledge activities. The productive services, technology services and other public goods can be provided by the third sector organizations or service providers from the market, while the local government mainly provides public goods in institutional forms to facilitate knowledge sharing and creation.This dissertation has extended the research level of knowledge governance to a cross-organizational level. It has also deepened related studies including types of governance mechanisms, role mechanisms, the impact factors on knowledge governance mechanisms, and provided research field of industrial cluster with a new perspective of "knowledge governance". Meanwhile, this study has developed a theoretical support for the healthy development of innovative clusters, the promotion of industrial restructuring and upgrading through the cluster transformation and upgrading, the innovation-driven industrial development, as well as the enhancement on the national development strategy of regional innovation capability and industrial competitiveness.
Keywords/Search Tags:innovative clusters, knowledge governance, contractual governance mechanism, relational governance mechanism, government governance
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