Internal Operation Mechanism Of Traditional Chinese Society, Justice And Benefit Under The Assumption That The Structure Of The Lexicographic Order

This treatise is about the inherent operational mechanism of the traditional China,which is under the special hypothesis of the justice-advantage lexicographic orderingstructure. We analyze the micro-behavior base of the traditional China, the evolutionalparticularity of the social structure, the particular trade mode, the specific socialclasses' arrangement, and the inherent openness of such a social structure. Thistreatise includes six chapters. Chapter one is about the different revealing mechanism and conflict-resolvingmechanism under the lexicographic ordering of justice-advantage in the traditionalChina. The lexicographic ordering of justice-advantage in the traditional China hasdetermined its members' behaviors not according with the principle of benefitmaximum. We argues that such a different social structure defines the generalbehavior manner and communication manner, making its people's decision-makingstart from the common benefit of the whole group or the society. This quality resultsin the Pareto optimum with the justice. The authors argue that only in the frame oftraditional lexicographic ordering of justice-advantage can the social problems such astraditional science development and ambiguous utterance be explained. Chapter two analyzes the long-term implicit reciprocal contract of the traditionalChina. We argue that if the reputation is not equal to the benchmark level, the wholesocial structure tends to converge to the ultrastable state. Under the condition of theslow economic development, when the designer concentrates on the profit flow toomuch, the benchmark reputation will do adjustment. We point out the restrictionelements, which influence the speed of reputation convergence, are the relativeattention level of the social structure designer, the relative coefficient of thereputation-profit and the expect proportional coefficient in the recursion process. Chapter three give the answer to the question of why the Evolution of thetraditional China appeared the characteristics of the ultrastable system. We analyzethe effect of the game of moral and the game of life on the traditional China'sultrastable evolutional process. We argue that as the protector of the traditional socialstructure, the ruled used insurgence to restructure the broken social structure, whichhad been destroyed by the ruler in the game of life. The new-classical-type game oflife tends to lead the social structure to the original position in which the moralreviviscence is possible. This tendency can not be weaken by the equity of the benefitdistribution, which is not same as the essential justice. At the same time, thesuccessful moral education helps to alleviate the severity of the game of life. Chapter four is on the trust trade of the traditional China and its transaction cost.We analyze the trust trade and its transaction cost. We argue that the essentialcharacter of the trade is the trust transaction with the necessary condition of the equaltrust range. The target of this kind of trade is to pursue the certainty and the safety. VThe strategy of randomizing the trust range threatens to smash the stability of thesocial structure .At the same time, the do-not-believe-strangers' strategy which playedby the developed countries blocks the potential international trade because thetransaction cost must be paid by the underdeveloped countries in such a presentinternational economic system. In Chapter 5, we discuss the matter about the relationship between the gentryclass and the Laissez-faire economy in the traditional China. We analyze therelationship between the scholar class, one of the four class in the traditional China,and the Laissez-faire economy. We prove the economic rationality of this special classfrom the point of view of the maximizing-the-total-society-benefit and theminimizing-the-transaction-cost. We point out the sub...