The Matter Of Integrity In Anglo-American Jurisprudence

Law is both an instrument of seeking the social goal of ultimate values and a system composed of different values. The matter of value is hard, and is also a subject which the legal science has to deal with. Ronald Dworkin attempts to use the term"integrity"to refer to a political value which is one of the points of law and is distinct from other three such values, namely justice, fairness and procedural due process. He names his legal theory based on a conception of legal interpretation law as integrity. Dworkin's theoretical claim causes quite a stir among legal theorists. Supporters and opponents examine the Neptune in the constellation of political and legal values newly discovered by Dworkin. Thus the matter of integrity becomes hot in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and the discussions extend beyond Dworkin's own theory.The integrity of law aims to keep a proper relation between the stability and development of law. The development of law has to find an equilibrium point between maintaining the consistency of current legal and political practices and acclimatizing itself to new situations emerging in the rapid change of society and economy. The law will lose its integrity, if it fails to keep consistent with the past. People will not depend on law as a tool of organizing the society, if it can not properly settle the new forms of disputes brought by the rapid change of society and economy. This is an inevitable problem during the current construction of legal system and rule of law in China. The discussions within Anglo-American jurisprudence may be helpful for us to consider the value problem in China's law and construction of rule of law.In order to thoroughly display the intellectual fruits of Anglo-American legal theorists on the matter of integrity, while focusing on Dworkin's law as integrity, the dissertation selects some typical supporters and opponents, and analyzes the relevant points of issue. The dissertation reconstructs the writers'theories through the question whether integrity is a distinct political value that law should seek to serve, and then examine each of them under some comments. The integrity of law discussed in this dissertation is related deeply to the practices of legislation and adjudication. This dissertation focuses on the integrity of legal practice as a kind of political practice. It is the integrity of legal practice itself secures the integrity of the system of legal norms as a whole.The dissertation has seven chapters. Chapter one is introduction, which is about the origin of the theme, some qualifications of this study, the research status at home and abroad, the approach of this study, and the structural arrangement.Section one of chapter two elaborates the methodological foundation of Dworkin's law as integrity, explores Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation, analyzes the basic elements of interpretative method, including interpretative attitude, three key terms (concept, paradigm and conception), and three stages and test criteria of an interpretation. The section answers the following questions: how to understand the formulation"law as interpretative concept"? What kind of interpretation is the legal interpretation considered by Dworkin? What typical criticisms does his theory of interpretation meet? And what are his replies? The author suggests, Dworkin's adoption of methodological interpretivism is caused by his fundamental judgment, law is a kind of interpretative concept, which is the conclusion of his conceptual analysis of law. Section two traces the development of Dworkin's law as integrity through three key conceptual apparatus, namely legal principle, chain of law and community. The author argues that in fact Dworkin holds law as integrity all the way, although he did not use the formulation of law as integrity, and have not developed a relatively mature interpretation.Chapter three analyzes Dworkin's law as integrity directly. The author suggests, Dworkin justifies the necessity and people's aspirations towards integrity in legislation through the dimensions of fit and justification. At the dimension of fit, he argues that the assumption that integrity is a distinct political value fits our political practice. At the dimension of justification, he argues that integrity will do credit to our politics, and will interpret our politics the best possible politics. Contrasted with other values of justice, fairness and procedural due process in political morality, the unique feature of integrity can be understood more deeply. Dworkin's law as integrity is summarized as follows: in the countries qualified to be a community of principle, the current legal system includes a set of political morally coherent legal principles, which are used to justify the more particular rules. Future legislators should follow these principles self-consciously, to avoid and dissolve the possible conflict among other values through pursuing integrity, and to maintain and improve integrity in law. While facing theoretical disagreements in the present and future, judges should follow these principles too. After drawing a panorama of Dworkin's law as integrity, the chapter discusses its two components: the principle of integrity in legislation and that in adjudication. Through people's intuitive rejection of check-board statutes, the author discusses the embodiment of integrity in legislation. The principle of integrity in Dworkin's law as integrity is elucidated under several sub-themes, namely the dimensions of fit and justification in legal interpretation, hard case and one right answer thesis, and consistency and integrity in adjudication and judicial activism.Chapter four introduces and evaluates two conceptions of law as integrity which are developed respectively by Dworkin's two followers, Jeremy Waldron and Gerald J. Postema. Waldron attempts to enquire Dworkin's presupposition, questions his ranking of the political values, and discusses the circumstances of integrity. Postema rearranges the relation between integrity and other values such as justice, fairness and procedural due process in political morality, and elaborates how the value of integrity works. The author suggests, these revisions actively respond to the call of Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation, not a completely negative attitude towards his methodology, therefore they can be regarded as the development and improvement of Dworkin's theory, and are the further researches on integrity.Chapter five introduces and evaluates the reviews and questions on the value of integrity by Denise Réaume, Larry Alexander, Joseph Raz and the advocates of Critical Legal Studies from various perspectives, teases out and discusses several typical critical arguments, and tests the critics through the former positive elaboration of law as integrity. The author suggests that some critics misunderstand Dworkin. They simply identify integrity with consistency of principle on its application, and read the idea of integrity too narrowly. The common mistake of critics is their neglect of the circumstances of integrity.Chapter six discusses the possible theoretical contributions and limits of law as integrity. The author expounds its three contributions: the first, it realizes that the law has been the most important method for the state to seek and maintain its political legitimacy in modern societies; the second, it attempts to search a proper relation for the political values sought by law; the third, it tries to coordinate the stability of law and the development of law through emphasizing the fidelity to the past. The author also discusses the methodological significance of law as integrity for China's construction of rule of law and research of legal value. The author analyzes two limits of law as integrity: the first, it fails to justify the citizen's obligation of obey the law; the second, its adherence to interpretative method makes it impossible for itself to solve the problem of values through focusing on the relations between values. In Chapter seven, the conclusion part, based on the above analysis, the author names the theoretical standpoint of Dworkin and his followers the legal idealism focusing on reality.