Research About Urban Housing Demolition System

In recent years, China's urbanization process has been developing rapidly, with urbanization rate growing from 27.63%in 1992 to 45.68%in 2008. However, the rate is still lower than that in developed countries, whose urbanization rates are generally more than 70%. Li Shantong, head of department of Development Strategy and Regional Economy Research, Development Research Center of the State Council, predicted that China's urbanization.rate will be raised to around 60%in 20 years, which means China's urbanization rate need to increase by 15%or so in the next 20 years and means that there will be 200 million people will flood into cities. The current carrying capacity of city is far from the demand of rapidly increased urbanization, which requires cities to be expanded or reconstructed n the original old city. Therefore, the demolition and transformation of the old city, has become inevitable in China's urbanization process.However, vicious conflicts caused by demolition these years are very shocking. The issue of demolition has become one of the major problems which bear economic development and social stability. Local governments undertake demolition under the guise of public interest, and then proceed to commercial development, and the low relocation compensation caused emotional confrontation, which greatly affected the government's credibility. "Urban Housing Demolition Management Regulations", based on which urban housing demolition is undertaken, has become the focus of public concern again and again. Reasonable solution to the problem of demolition depends on sound and perfect laws. How to make demolition system ensure the safety of people's property, and the demolition work could be done in an orderly manner; not only meet the needs of the development of urbanization, but also prevent the emergence of social group incidents and maintain social stability; both ensure fairness and ensure efficiency, so that the interests of relocation people, developers, local governments and the central government in the demolition can be promoted or has not at least been lost, and at last Pareto Optimize can be achieved. The dissertation, from the perspective of New Institutional Economics, in response to such focuses in China's Urban Housing Demolition as the public interest, compensation standards and the role of government, explains some phenomena emerging in China's Urban Housing Demolition, evaluates the existing "Urban Housing Demolition Regulations" and offers some suggestions for the forthcoming "State-owned Land Housing Levy and Compensation Regulations".The dissertation can be divided into eight chapters or parts.The first part of the dissertation introduces the background, the purpose, theoretical and practical significance of the study of urban housing demolition system based on new institutional economics. Research literature at home and abroad is sorted and commented on and the dissertation's methodology as well as technical route and structural arrangements are also given in this part.The second part of the dissertation gives an analysis of the efficiency of the existing urban housing demolition system. When evaluating a thing, we should not just look at the amount of its output, or its "effect", we should at the same time look at the relative relationship between its input and its output, that is, its "efficiency". Similarly, for the issue of urban housing demolition, we should not just analyze the driving force of urban housing demolition in the change of the overall appearance of the city and employment, the contributions to the economic growth of local area and surrounding area, etc. These are all from the point of view of "effect". At the same time, we also need to take the relative relationship between input and output or "efficiency" into consideration in the studies of China's urban housing demolition. First, some basic theoretical issues are accounted for, and then the demolition systems at home and abroad are compared, a city housing demolition efficiency evaluating model is being tried to build, the empirical evidence of some cities'urban housing demolition efficiency is given.The third part studies compensation mechanism of urban housing demolition. The problem of compensation is one of the core issues in demolition and inadequate compensation for demolition of housing is generally considered to be one of the main causes of frequent conflicts between demolishing party and the party being relocated. According to the current relocation compensation model, government decides the demolition area, and then government decides demolition compensation price. If the party being relocated is not satisfied with the compensation price, the demolishing party applies to the former management departments for arbitration. The party refusing to accept the result can apply to the people's court. During the prosecution, the demolition can be forced to undertake. This method of demolition evaluation and compensation system has determined that local governments have absolute right to decide the compensation standards and the amount of compensation. And, if there are objections to compensation standards, the party being relocated can not find any appeal mechanisms, inevitably leading to confrontations and conflicts. This part studies the existing urban housing demolition evaluation and compensation methods, points out some problems and gives suggestions for a reasonable compensation model.The fourth part analyzes the urban housing demolition behavior under the perspective of multi-game. China's current pattern of urban housing demolition was the result of multi-game of the people being relocated, developers, local government and central government. Although in real life, this result is not optimal for each party, but it is resulted from each party's common pursuit of its own benefits under their own constraints. With the changes of each party's constraints, this balance has gradually been broken, the new equilibrium will arise. This part first reviews the main problems in the demolition at current stage, and then gives a game analysis of each party, thereby establishing multi-game models of relocated people, developers, local government and the central government. Through the analysis of the models, this part points out the reasons for the plight of each party, and then points out that in the pattern of multi-dimensional game in urban housing demolition, central government's game strategy plays a leading role, for the strategies all the other parties adopt are based on central government's game strategy. Only the central government can change the existing pattern of the game and avoid all sorts of conflicts caused by urban housing demolition at this stage.The fifth part studies urban housing demolition system based on Pareto Optimize. In unban demolition which involves the Government, developers, and the relocated people, the relocated people belong to vulnerable group. When the demolition system is implemented without protecting their legitimate rights and interests, their earnings have been violated by local governments and developers. To achieve Pareto Optimize, demolition can not be undertaken at the cost of relocated people. This part analyzes the power source of the demolition under the existing land system, and then explores the achievement of Pareto Optimize of the stakeholders. After analyzing the existing urban demolition.system, this part proposes conditions to-achieve Pareto Optimize, devises urban demolition system based on Pareto Optimize, set forth the secondary compensation for relocated people which can be achieved within the framework of power balance, and finally gives the policy implications of the dissertation.The sixth Part studies the public interest, compensation standards and the role of government in urban housing demolition by using the cases in China's urban housing demolition management system reform. Through analyzing some typical cases in recent urban housing demolitions, the part provides insight into the game process of the interest groups and the internal law of the changes in China's urban demolition system. By exploring such core issues as public interest, compensation standards and the role of government, the part also gives an analysis of and comment on the relevant provisions of the new Regulations. This part Points out the great progressive significance of the new Regulations compared with the old Regulations in philosophy behind legislation, making a relatively clear-cut definition of public interest, locating the local government's role in the demolition, market-oriented compensation standards, the establishing accountability mechanisms against brutal and violent demolition, etc. and then points out that there are still unresolved issues in the new Regulations, for example, is it the public interest that requires transformation of the old buildings, Is majority voting mechanism scientific and feasible, Does the economic zone established to develop the economy belong to the public interest, And so on. Moreover, there is a big controversy over the Supplementary of the Draft. Finally, the part offers suggestions to further improve and revise "State-owned Land Housing Levy and Compensation Regulations (draft)".The seventh part of the dissertation gives research findings and policy recommendations. Based on the above research findings, this part concludes that the theoretical foundations and methodologies presented in the dissertation are applicable to the settlement of all kinds of problems in the present urban housing demolition. This part points out that the secondary compensation theory presented in the dissertation can address the current game plight of urban housing demolition and achieve the balance of interest within the framework of power balance. The part finally gives policy recommendations to further improve and amend "State-owned Land Housing Levy and Compensation Regulations (draft)".