Study Of The Efficiency Of The China Securities Investment Fund

The Dissertation, commenced from the analysis of informational asymmetries in making an investment fund contract, is dedicated to a comprehensive study of the efficiency of the Chinese Security Investment Funds (CSIFs). The Game Theory, the Informational Economics and the Contractarianism are employed in the dissertation as the main theoretical foundation. Approaches such as the empirical analysis, comparative analysis and institutional analysis are adopted. The dissertation generalizes the conclusion that the adverse selection and moral hazard led by ex ante and ex post informational asymmetries can explain most of low efficiency of CSIFs. The dissertation also explores the schemes to solve the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in CSIFs. The key to the pervious is to enhance the supply of fund information by setting up an efficient system of fund information supply, in which the role of intermediate organization should be prominent. As to the latter, one effective schemes is to enhance the internal governance by developing the company-type fund. And the goal can also be achieved by improving the salary structure to induce the efforts from the fund manager. And promoting the competition in the fund management market to and develop the open end fund can also serve the mission. The dissertation is organized as follows.Section 1 is an introduction to the whole dissertation.Section 2 portrays the evolution and the development of consists of CSIFs. And the efficiency of CSIFs in every period is described in detail.Sections 3 analyze the adverse selection problem of CSIFs and the improvement of information supply of CSIFs.Section 4 gives an empirical analysis on CSIFs. The conclusion is the investment performance can be a signal to screen CSIFs.Section 5 analyzes the moral hazard problem of CSIFs and the improvement of internal governance structure.Section 6 analyzes the role of incentive mechanism and the external monitoringmechanism in solving the moral hazard problem of CSEFs. Section 7 analyzes the improvement of fund regulation. Section 8 is the conclusion.