On The Role Of Banks In Corporate Governance Structure

Since the year of l932 the proposition 't Separation of ownrship and control"was preseoted by A. Berle and G. Means in his initiated practical research, it has keptbeing one of the most importam aspects fOr the research of the colltradcton ofprincipal-agent of the interest of ownr and manager in corporation caused by theproposition. It also becomes the core problem in the research of corporate govemanceWhich reached the high tide since the middle of 80' s. In order tO satisfy theshareholders and interest grouPs in corporation management, Various cotheiesespecially transitional economies make great effOrtS tO seeking a proper fOrm ofcorporate govemance.At present, corporatC govemance in differeflt cotheies manifests mainly in twOstyles, bank-oriented in JaPan and Germany being the model and markct-oriethed inthe United States and England being the typical case. However, it is hard tO give adeterminative evalwtion tO say whch is bther. The fac that bubble economy sincethe end of 80's and the lasting economic dePression in JaPan and tWo digits ratC ofunemPloyment and low economic grow after the union of Germany gives a rathergood nUmer of scholars strong hints: do they have relationship in some degree withtheir bankng-oriented corporate govemance?After more than ten years development, corporations in China undergo a series ofrefOrms, al1 these reform measures fundamentally imProve the incentive system ofcorporations in our coUntry but as refOrm gOes deePer, the Phenomena of "InsiderCondol" becomes more serious. So the corporatC governance in China behaves asthe "Insider Condol" Under the governance illtCrvelltion. It becomes the focus ofour govemance work and theory research hoW to establish a proper corporategovemance to cofltTol the "Insider Cofltrol" so as to promote our coUntr'scorporation refOrm and tO sPeed uP the eStablishmeni of modern corporation syStem.From two asPects I stlldy the role of conunercial bank in corporate governance inthe thesis. In one hand I discuss the mechansm of bank in corporate govemance, inthe other hand I try to present a method using fOr a reference to help the choice ofstyles of efficient corporate govemance in our coUntry. It consists of five parts.As an introduction in chaPter one, the research excitation and its purpose isstated, research method, research expeCtations and some terminology also present.From five aspects including the origin, the meaning, frame of reference, themechanism and corporation financing of corporate govemance the principle analysisis performed. It conStrUcts the analytical background of the thesis in chaPter tWo.After that, in chaPter three theoretical analysis of the function of bank control isdone. Basing Marxism financial caPita theory financial intermediary theory financialrestrain, financial Institution control theory, the basis of bank control, I demonstrate that bank has strong control function. This presents the theoretical evidences for my work.Applying the analysis method of comparative institutions in chapter four the different roles of banking in corporate governance in Germany, Japan and the America are compared referred to the system foundation, the mechanism, the performances and the evaluation of corporate governance. In the last chapter, the possible role that banking plays in corporate governance in our country is discussed through the analysis of the courses of enterprise reforms in China and of the variances of relationships between banking and enterprise. And I present some relative policy suggestionsIn the point of view of bank control the relationships between banking and enterprises are analyzed, the complete analysis both in theory and in practice are carried about the capacity of banking control. Banking has strong control on corporation by credit and shareholder equity. Because of asymmetric information, bank' s credit control intends to become weak. This needs the co-operation of bank' s credit control and mechan...