| In western countries, there has been one hundred years' history of Merger and Acquisition (M & A) of firms, while in China, there is only twenty years' practice. Under the background of economic globalization, how to shorten the gap of firms' M & A between China and developed countries and to face the challenge of theory and institution construction are the urgent tasks before us. During this process, government intervention may play an important role. Therefore, how to treat government intervention during firms' M & A, how to regulate government's behavior and to increase the efficiency and social welfare of government intervention become the focus of this thesis.Combining the methods of new classical economics and new institutional economics, and based on the theories of M & A and government intervention, this thesis focuses on the analysis of the role and logic of government intervention in M & A. We first analyze the reasons why government will intervene M & A of firms. Then we present various types of government interventions. We also discuss the performance and welfare results of government intervention. Firms' reaction to government intervention is also the content of our analysis.Another logic clue of this thesis is from the complete competing market theory to the reality of incomplete competing market, from the experiences of developed countries to the practices of China's transition economy. Through comparison, we drew our conclusion that, there is no direct links between the degrees of government intervention and the development level of one country. Whether firms' M & A takes place in a developed country, or it happens in a developing country, government intervention is a necessary part for the effectiveness of firms' M & A. The differences lie in the measures, mechanisms and degree of government intervention.So far as China's transitional economy is concerned, due to the natural links between government and State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs), also with the shortage and lag of institution provision, it is endogenously needed that government take part in the M & A of firms. Since government must work as the administrator of the whole society, thus it cannot behave as a pure investor of the firm. It must also take the social and political aims into consideration as well as economic efficiency aims while intervening into the M & A of firms. So we know that the M & A of SOEs is a multi-task practice, including both economic targets and social targets as well. Theory is the basis of behavior. So in chapter two, we first make an retrospection of the M & A theories of western countries. The characteristics of five M & A waves and government's roles are discussed. At the same time we give a brief introduction to China'sM & A theories and government's behavior in M & A. Then two hypotheses are discussed and commented by us. In chapter three, we analyze the reasons why government intervene into firms' M & A from two angles of theory and practice respectively. The motions, characteristics, and internal logic of firms' M & A are argued. The motions of government intervention in developed countries are also presented. The last part of this chapter discusses the motion of China's government intervention. A theoretic hypothesis of agents' utility maximization is given and tested here.Behavior analysis is the core of this thesis. In chapter four, we discuss in detail the behavior of government intervention in firms' M & A. First we present the evolution of government intervention theories and the relationship between government intervention and M & A. Then we analyze China's government intervention behaviors during transition. We point out that in China, government intervention is actually a kind of administrative behavior based on the power of the state. Comparing with developed countries, there is much more impression of government intervention during China firms' M & A process.Performance is the criterion of measuring behavior. So in chapter five, we first present t...
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