The Legal Myth Of The State Ownership

This dissertation is a study on the legal myth of the state ownership and thecorporatization of China's state-owned enterprises(SOEs)．Chapter one is the introduction of the dissertation．As a civil law concept,the"ownership"includes the state ownership and private ownership．A good many personconsiders that there is no essential difference between two kinds of ownership．This ideais the theoretic fundament of corporatization of China's SOEs．Chapter two points that the essence of state ownership is not a private right but a publicpower．This part analyzes the relationship between the people and the state in the stateownership system．The model of"agency and principle"can not be used to interpretabove relationship．The state is an"agency"of the people without the latter's consent inthe state ownership system．State ownership is a kind of public power,which has alldangers as a kind of public power．Chapter three analyzes the distribution of power,interest and risk in the state ownershipsystem．It is impossible that the whole people undertake risk or enj oy profit collectively．The state plays as a center role in the distribution of interest and risk．Chapter four analyzes the restrictive and incentive system of the state ownership．Thispart points that the restrictive system of the state ownership is a kind of supervision fromthe state force．The essence of incentive system is the distribution of state rent．Chapter five and chapter six study the defining program and the evaluating program ofstate property．Chapter seven analyzes the widespread abuses of the administrativepowers in the program of the corporatization of SOEs．Chapter eight compares legal rulesand defacto rules over the transference of the ownership of SOEs．Chapter nine is the conclusion,which is that the state ownership should not be used forcommercial targets.