Font Size: a A A

A Study Of The Issues Relating To The "M&A Conglomerate" Of Listed Companies

Posted on:2005-05-26Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:C H LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360125458956Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the evolution of the Merger & Acquisition (M&A) by foreign enterprises, the waves of M&A have mostly occurred during economic transition. China is currently an economic transition. M&A activities in the stock market have emerged in quick successions, so the stock market's function of resources redistribution is becoming increasingly distinct. The opening of the capital market has let the foreign capital play in the M&A market directly. Are the Chinese enterprises ready to face the challenge? In fact, Chinese entrepreneurs with discernment had formed many "dance with the wolves" conglomerates by the M&A in the stock market. These affiliated listed companies in the Share-A stock market are controlled by the same actual controller, which is decisive to the listed companies' operation and development Control of at least one of the affiliated listed companies is gained by M&A. This paper calls them the "M&A Conglomerate" of listed companies.The related aspects of the "M&A Conglomerate" of listed companies involved multi-branches of knowledge. It is also the area of research for the financial accounting and management science. The theoretical discussion and the empirical study of the "M&A Conglomerate" of listed companies are scarce in the domestic academic community. By using the knowledge of the financial accounting and management science, this paper investigates that whether the "M&A Conglomerate" of listed companies has improved competitive advantages and dominating power? Or increased the wealth for the shareholder of the listed company? Or just sought short-term profits through making use of the institutional defection and market misguiding. Then this paper provides the references for the government, Chinese entrepreneurs and individual investors.The stakeholders involved in the "M&A Conglomerate" of listed companies are complicated, and the actual controller is at the core status. Therefore, this paper conducts the research from the point of the actual controller's value conceptions and interests, and reviews the value of theshareholders of the acquisition company and target company in the "M&A Conglomerate" of listed companies. Following is the brief introduction to the structure and main points of this paper.Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter introduces the background and the significance of this topical selection, explains the main concepts of M&A, specifies the research object, point, and methods, summarizes the conclusions and the contributions.Chapter 2: Theories of M&A and Literature Review. This chapter provides a classification and sorting of the overseas and domestic theories on the motive and performance of M&A. The motive and performance of M&A themselves is closely related to the fluctuation and periodicity of social economy; moreover, M&A behaviors usually involve interested parties who have different standpoints and expectations. Therefore, whether in mature markets abroad or emerging markets like China, any single M&A theory is sufficient only for the explanation of some M&A behaviors and their outcomes, and has its own limitation in terms of applicability. The diversity of the outcomes of the empirical studies of overseas and domestic scholars has confirmed this point.Chapter 3: Cause of formation of the "M&A Conglomerate" of Listed Companies. This chapter investigates the exogenous factor and endogenous factor of the "M&A Conglomerate" of listed companies, mainly including the inducement of the institution of the stock market in China's special economic environment and the internal motive of Chinese enterprises' pursuit of growth.This chapter takes advantage of Aoki Masahiko's definition of "institution" - "An institution is a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs about how the game is played repeatedly", to perform an analysis of the M&A behaviors of the actual controllers of the "M&A Conglomerate", including the "backdoor listing" resulting from the share issuance system, "negotiated acquisition" caused by equity liquidity breakdown, "zero-cost acquisitions" caused by the p...
Keywords/Search Tags:Listed Company, M&A Conglomerate, Cause of Formation and Performance
PDF Full Text Request
Related items