Corporate Cross-shareholdings, Theoretical Study: Endogenous, Efficiency, Control And Implications For China

Because of its importance and difficulty, the enterprises reform has been the core of China's economic reform from the beginning to now. At present, the establishment of the modern corporation system has become the key issue of China's enterprises reform. Being lack of the practice experience, the establishment of the modern corporation system in China asks for the combination of China's reality with the overseas experience and lessons. Today, there are two typical kinds of the corporation system in the world: A system, which is in the United States of America and in the United Kingdom, and J system, which is in Japan. Among them, A system has been well studied in China, but J system, especially the cross shareholding, which is one of the most important features of J system, has not drawn enough attention of study in China. However, it is showed that, in China, at present, many conditions that the cross shareholding required is emerging, and many phenomena and outcome like the cross shareholding has appeared. So, in order to present some guidance to China's enterprises reform to ensure its correct direction, it is of great importance to analyzes the issues of the cross shareholding theoretically. And, the theoretical study to the issues of the cross shareholding also has great significance to the development of the firm theory and the industry organization theory.This paper is a theoretical analysis of issues of the cross shareholding, which includes the endogenicity, the efficiency and the regulation of the cross shareholding, and its revelation to China's enterprises reform.The study in this paper follows such path: using the comparative institution approach, the transaction cost approach and the game theory, first, analyzes the reason that the cross shareholding .came into being. Then, analyzes the efficiency of the cross shareholding in two aspects. The first is concerned with the incentive problems inside corporations, that is to analyze the changes of the principal-agent problems in corporations caused by the cross shareholding. The second is concerned with the industry organization, that is to analyze the issue of the reduction of the transactioncosts and the issue of the anti-competition caused by the vertical cross shareholding and the horizontal cross shareholding. And then, on the basis of the analysis of the efficiency of the cross shareholding and the regulatory policy to the cross shareholding in Japan and the United States of America, analyzes the issue of the regulation of the cross shareholding. Finally, analyzes the revelation to China's enterprises reform of the cross shareholding.The structure of this paper is as follow:Chapter 1 is an introduction to this paper, which includes three issues: the significance of the analysis in this paper, the analysis tools and methods used in this paper, and the structure of this paper.Chapter 2 is an introduction to the cross shareholding. In this chapter, this paper gives the definition and the classification of the cross shareholding, introduces some other corporation systems and financial systems close associated with the cross shareholding in Japan, and defines the object of the analysis in this paper.Chapter 3 is a survey of literature of the cross shareholding. In this chapter, after analyzing the position of the study of the cross shareholding in the firm theory, this paper gives a survey of the literature of the cross shareholding in four aspects, which are the principal-agent problems, the non-principal-agent problems, the industry organization, and the dissolution and its effects of the cross shareholding. Then, this chapter points out some problems in the literature and, accordingly, introduces the focus of the study in this paper.From Chapter 4, this paper begin to enter the theoretical analysis of the cross shareholding. After a brief introduction of the history of the formation of the cross shareholding in Japan, from the disperse and the protection of the quasi-rents of managers' specific human assets and the prevention from the...