Distribution Of The Corporate Governance Rights Based On Integrated Contract

Since 1980s, studying on corporate governance has already expanded to a global theories and practice task. However, there still are ultimate divergences about two fundamental problem of corporate governance. One is what are the principles of corporate governance. The other is whether human capital owner should share in the ownership of the firm. The solutions of these two problems will directly relate to the establishment of the modern enterprise system of our country. So, this dissertation is entitled distribution of the corporate governance rights based on integrated contract, and study who are, what kinds are, and why they are the men answering for corporate governance.This dissertation launches on foundation theories, advances the multi-nature of the frontier of the firm that is used to ascertain who are stakeholders and what are the three corporate governance rights that are interior governance rights, stakeholders exterior governance rights and market governance rights, ravels out the connotation of "confirming property right" that is used to make sure what is the aim corporate governor participate in corporate governance. According to these, this dissertation forms the concept of the distribution of the corporate governance rights and the concept of corporate governance based on integrated contract. "Based on integrated contract" emphasizes that the distribution of the corporate governance rights is a contract that completely consider the request of all business participators, and completely consider all kinds of corporate governance rights.Later, this dissertation sets up the general analysis frame of the distribution of the corporate rights based on integrated contract. Firstly, applying cooperative game and its core, this dissertation proves the effect of asset specific in distribution stakeholders governance rights and market governance rights, and confirms the governance power sources for single market contract participator. Secondly, in the discussion about the distribution factors between interior governance rights and stakeholders exterior governance rights, this dissertationintroduces the centralized contractual agent and asset exclusive, expands the scope of asset specific, explains stakeholders exterior governance rights' power sources, defines the preponderant people of information and the preponderant people of punishment, proves the essential conditions of stakeholders cooperation in interior governance, arguments potential paths that stakeholders participate interior governance, establishes the cost-income hypothesis of interior governance and exterior governance. Thirdly, application evolutionary game theory, this dissertation explain the influence of institution factor to the distribution of the corporate governance rights.Subsequently, on the general analyze frame's foundation, according to four characteristics of the human capitals, this dissertation discusses respectively theirs influence on carrier of human capita] sharing the corporate governance rights, and its trend along with the social economic development. For the adverse selection in pricing human capital because of the difficult to measure human capital, this dissertation describes the reasons, results and its solutions.Finally, applying these conclusions and aiming at three hot problems, this dissertation reasons out some meaningful conclusions. The key sticking point of state-owned enterprise of our country is the faultiness of market mechanism. The policy path dependence of our country come to that the state-owned enterprise is more feasible to adapt to the co-governance mechanism. Despite a lot of problems produced by "a biggest shareholder", but the problems does not consist in the "a biggest shareholder", the source consist in the integrated corporate governance is not perfect.