Strategies On China's SOEs Governance:Theoretical And Positive Research Of A Fiscal Issue

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) exist in all countries despite their different social nature. Therefore, governance of SOEs is a common task for all countries. SOEs is closely linked with Public Finance in China. Therefore, strategies on the SOEs governance become an important fiscal issue. Analysis in the aspect of SOEs governance strategy could be one of the important approaches to further promote the theories and practices on Public Finance.This thesis explores the most prominent and urgent problems in developing strategies for governance of SOEs in the transitional period by analyzing the problems in view of their respective feature. The thesis mainly touches upon the following aspects; international comparison and contrast of governance of SOEs, corporate governance of SOEs, incentive mechanism for managers of SOEs, supervision and disincentive mechanism for SOEs and insider control within SOEs. These five aspects cannot be sequenced with a unified criterion of classification, so the thesis talks about them one after another according to their magnitudes of importance.The first chapter of the thesis represents the introduction part, which lays down the basis for the opinions expounded in the thesis. This chapter gives strict definitions to issues covered in the thesis, such as SOEs and corporate governance, made a brief introduction to the logical preconditions followed by the thesis as well as the approaches of research, and gives a genera; picture of the structure of the thesis.The second chapter begins to roll out the analysis of the problems in view of their respective feature. This chapter lists and elaborates on four most representative patterns of government'ssupervision over and management of state-owned assets and several typical SOEs governance cases, and then puts forward three elements for efficient governance of SOEs.The third chapter reviews the process of the historical changes of the corporate governance of SOEs from administration-oriented governance to market-oriented governance, analyses the problems existing in the governance structure of SOE legal persons and the causes thereof, and puts forward goals of and approaches to building the corporate governance of SOEs.The fourth chapter mainly dwells upon the incentive mechanism of SOE managers. This chapter begins with an analysis of the general theories related to incentives for managers, reviews designs for payment system of SOE managers, designs for stock option system and reputation incentives, and puts forward corresponding approaches and solutions.The fifth chapter, based on an analysis of the basis content of the supervision and control mechanisms of corporation enterprises, analyses the commonalities and differences between the supervision and control mechanisms of SOEs and those of ordinary private enterprises, points out the deficiencies existing in the supervision and control mechanisms of SOEs and identifies some solutions to improve the mechanisms.The sixth chapter focuses on the issue of insider control within SOEs, makes a comprehensive analysis of the representations of the problems, and the causes and Preventative Approaches thereof, and suggests some general and special preventive measures for different SOEs.