A Study On Game Behavior And Operational Mechanism Of Debt-to-Equity Swaps In Stated-owned Enterprises

For a long time, the high rate of liabilities generally exists in the state-owned enterprises of our country. Corresponding to this, state-run commercial banking systems have accumulated a large amount of non-performing assets and equivalent financial risks. These problems have aroused great concern from decision department and academia for many years. With the purpose of improving the assets quality of banks, reducing financial risks and alleviating the debt burden of state-owned enterprise, and meanwhile gaining time to perfect its operating mechanism and governance structure, to resume and rebuild the normal credit relationship between banks and enterprises, finally to make the whole state-owned economy step into the market-based normal development track, Some state-owned enterprise began their debt-to-equity swap reform since 1999. However, the results of debt-to-equity swap mentioned above may be the theory expectancy or a kind of good hope. The debt-to-equity swap operational practices of four years show quite a few state-owned enterprises do not have reduced substantively their rate of liabilities and improved substantively their operating mechanism because of debt-to equity swap, and four major state-run commercial banks seem not to improve fundamentally the asset management and bad loan deposited in the state-owned enterprise. There are a lot of reasons to cause the current situation and predicament of the debt-to-equity swap, such that the related external environment condition is unripe, and the debt-to-equity swap policy exists in many inherent contradiction, and so on, but the behind origin cause of formation is that we have not considered the game behavior of stakeholders who attach themselves to the process of debt-to-equity swap from the beginning. This kind of policy design and operation course of debt-to-equity swap at present, would induce that putting debt-to-equity swaps in practice deviated from the re-set target of the country and policy route because of conflict of interest between collective and individual.Actually operation of debt-to-equity swap must be the game course of stakeholders having interest conflict on the control right of state-owned enterprise and eminent domain of state-owned financial resource. And then, implementation of debt-to-equity swap, must cause game behavior of conflicting as well as cooperating. On the basis of views mentioned above, deep indication that debt-to-equity swap of our country should have is to revitalize the interests of stakeholders involved in debt-to-equity swap and to perfect the corporation governance and modern banking system according to the rule of market economy. To ensure to realize the re-target or reduce the risk and lose of debt-to-equity swap as much as possible, it is necessary to make stipulations to affect the realization of game equilibrium in the policy. This is a mechanism design process, and our country's policy design must be based on this kind of equilibrium analysis. So, this dissertation portrays the game behavior of the inter-dynamic courses of debt-to-equity swap by the basic principle and method of game theory, and analyze and predict various kinds of questions that might appear in the operation of debt-to-equity swap, thus provide the basis that can be operated for making the relevant policy.After analyzing foreign operation mode and practical experience of debt-to-equity swap, the policy background and reason of putting debt-to-equity swap in practice were discussed in China. In the ripe market economy country, the debt-to-equity swap does not break away from the procedure of bankruptcy, and in the developing country, the debt-to-equity swap reflects their privatization process. It is important to ensure the mobility of the stock equity, to recombine enterprises and to design the operational mechanism of encouraging banks to deal with non-performing loan effectively after debt-to-equity swaps. In China, when the problems of non-performing loan in state-run banks and vast debt in state-owned enterprises threaten...