Study On The Residual Control Rights Of Corporate Governance

On the basis of residual control rights, this paper intends to find out the corporate governance principles and its developing direction. Some theoretical propositions are put forward in the paper, which are validated by the practice of residual control rights arrangement in China' s enterprises and by comparison of different modes of residual control rights arrangement in other countries. The paper consists of there sections including seven chapters. The first two sections emphasizes particularly on theoretical analysis. Firstly, the connotation and extension of residual control rights are defined definitely. Then, the share institution of residual control rights is proved to be optimal by consideration of two aspects, which are the evolvement of residual control rights contracts in different periods and the characteristics of human capital ownership. With the foundation of above theoretical analysis, data and cases of China' s enterprises and governance modes in each county are used to make experiential analyze. The contents of the whole paper are structured as follows:The first two chapters are included in section 1, in which the main theme of the paper is proposed. Chapter 1 refers to the importance of residual control rights in corporate governance from research background, theoretical and practical significance. Chapter 2 compares the concept of residual control rights with other three concepts in detail on the basis of relative views in previous literatures, which relates tightly each other, namely asset ownership, explicit control rights and residua claims. Thereby, the connotation and extension of residual control rights are defined explicitly, and then the general principles of residual control rights arrangement are put forward.Section 2 consists of chapter 3 and chapter 4. It induces and validates the proposition theoretically that residual control rights in enterprises evolve according to a track from sole possession to share. Chapter 3 investigates the evolvement process of residual control rights contracts in different periods, from which the general principles of residual control rights arrangement are induced. Along with the evolvement of enterprise institutions in different ages, the residual control rights contracts in enterprise experience three stages. We can find that the residual control rights arrangement presents a trend from sole possession to share. At the same time, following the total principle of symmetry between residual control rights and residual claims, the distributions of residual control rights and residual claims have a trend from centralized symmetry to disperse symmetry.Chapter 4 considers the influence of human capital speciality and partial inseparability on optimal residual control rights arrangement. Combined with the partial inseparability of human capital ownership, a comparatively static model is established starting from stimulating speciality investment afore to analyze the allocation of residual control rights how to affect the stimulus of trade parts, and then affect the efficiency and value of enterprise. When investment has speciality and the contracts are incomplete, the traders are prone to hold up the counterpart, with a result of insufficiency of speciality investment. Self-enforcement contracts and vertical integration cannot settle the problem of holding up induced by human capital. After theoretical analysis, chapter 4 educes a proposition that can be tested: the trade between human capital owner and enterprise is in fact a game process of demising some equities each other. Because of the partial inseparability of human capital ownership and...