Dualistic Shareholding Structure And The Research Of Control Right Allocation Of Listed Company

At a time, there were great expectations on the stock market from every field: the government expected to realize the objective of optimum distribution of resources through the stock market; the state-owned enterprises hoped to solve the difficulty of business through the stock market; investors expected to complete original accumulation of treasure through the stock market; the theories of economists were applied in the stock market. However, it does not happen as one wish, the function structure of the stock market is far from the expectations of the most people. After painful reflection, people discover that the inefficient allocation of the control right level of companies destroy the micro-foundation of the efficient function of the whole market.The research of this thesis shows that the dualistic shareholding structure is the ultimate reason that causes the inefficiency of control right allocation of the listed companies. The reasons of a lot of problems can be found under the analytic structure of dualistic shareholding structure. For example, the dilemma problem of manager motivation of listed companies; the riddle of equity financing preference of listed companies; the capital overuse of listed companies; the problem of compensation mechanism of control right transfer of listed companies and the riddle of MBO of listed companies etc. The overall structure of the thesis is as below: First, we systematically propose the dualistic shareholding structure problem of listed companies, then analyze the formation mechanism of dualistic shareholding structure of listed companies, and summarize the characteristics of dualistic shareholding structure of listed companies. Consequently, we bring the problem of control right allocation efficiency into the analytic structure of dualistic shareholding structure. Secondly, we create a multi-client agency agent model on the basis of dualistic shareholding structure to analyze the principal-agent problem of listed companies and come to the conclusion by research that the dualistic shareholding structure of listed company will definitely lead to the difficulty of manager motivation. Thirdly, we create a series of value effect model of equity financing and analyze the determinant problem of financing structure of listed company on the basis of conclusion of those models: under the structure of monopoly of non-floating shareholder and dualistic shareholding structure, the equityfinancing preference of listed company is endogenous because of the inherent requirement of pursuing maximum value by non-floating shareholder. Therefore, the riddle of equity financing preference is solved. For the problem of capital overuse of listed company, on the one hand, the problem is related to the dualistic shareholding structure. Equity capital is usually overused within the dualistic shareholding structure of company. On the other hand, the capital overuse is relevant with the fact that the market cannot provide correct information about capital cost. Fourthly, the dividend policy of listed company has always being an important influence on the efficiency of stock market. There are two remarkable characteristic of dividend policy of listed company of China: low dividend and duality. The characteristic of low dividend is usually deemed as a reason for people to censure the low efficiency of listed company. However, the analytic conclusion shows that the key of dividend policy of listed company is not low dividend but it is really the duality of dividend. Therefore, we construct a value effect model of dividend of listed company on the basis of dualistic shareholding structure and analyze the shareholder wealth effect of dividend policy of listed company. From the analysis, we have drawn the conclusion that the value of floating shareholder is harmed under the dualistic shareholding structure. The policy meaning of the conclusion is that the compulsory dividend policy cannot protect the interests of floating shareholders and it actually hurts the interests of floating shareholders. Fifthly, we have researched the phenomenon of control right transfer of listed company. On the basis of research, we provide theoretical explanation and empirical analysis on the frequent phenomena of control right transfer of listed company and put forward the theory hypothesis of compensation mechanism of control right transfer of listed company. In the theoretical hypothesis of compensation mechanism of control right, it is hypothesized that because of the insider trading benefit that is brought by control right transfer, the manager of listed company who originally lost benefit of control right turn to be the promoter of control right transfer on the contrary. This analytical conclusion is distinctively different from the situation of traditional state-owned enterprises and empirical analysis provides strong proof for the theoretical hypothesis above. Sixthly, there are also theoretical research and empirical analysis about MBO problem of listed company in this thesis. The functions of MBO as a kind of motivation mechanism are obviously not replaceable in clarifying...