Listing The Legal Regulation Of Corporate Executives Pay

This article explores the appropriate approach to the regulation of listing corporations executives' execessive remuneration. The first part of this article introduce the status of executives'remuneration. It is pointed out that the excess high level of executive compensation depart the interest of shareholder. With the framework of agency cost theory, this part describe the evolution that compensation system become part of agency cost. In this part, the core issue is that what is the appropriate react of law to this problem.Chapter two discuss the constant response to the problem regulation on remuneration. This part retrospect the processand the effect of regulation on the remuneration of executives of state-owned enterprises. Legislation on the level of compensatino confronts many challenges such as its legamacy and effectness. So direct regulation is an mission impossible.Chapter three probe into whether tax rule can cap payment sucessfully. The practice of American tax law demonstrate that tax law can not bring obvious effec. Tax law can even bring out some adverse effect. Tax law can not bear the overweight burden.Cahpter four review court's function in restricting executives'payment. Judicial review on the decision of board of directors is necessary but not efficient. It is shareholder not court that is the best party to determine whether compensation level is excess high. The judicial decision actually reflect the position of court that judges are reluntant to be involved in the problem of executive remuneration.Chapter five deals with option accounting. With the change of the structure of compensati, option become the important source of income to executives. However, the accounting method for stock option raise battle between investors and executive. After comparing the advantage and disavantage of different accounting metho, it is concluded that fair value approach can be the appropriae method to measure the real cost of remneration.