Study Of Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict

This dissertation intends to tackle this question: despite the great power disparity between the actors in asymmetric conflicts, why do the strong lose to the weak?The research object of the dissertation is asymmetrical conflict since World War Two (1945-2007), and it considers the four types of theories (the"interests of symmetry,""regime,""foreign aid"and"strategic type") as the reference variables. Through the verification of 36 asymmetric conflicts, the research shows that there is a correlation between the strategy type adopted and the outcome of"defeating a strong enemy". Therefore, the analysis is mainly holding a strategic perspective.Law is found, and the theory is invented. Although the data show that the weak uses"asymmetric strategy"to defeat the strong, but the causal relationship between the two still need verification. In order to provide a basic framework, I first of all explain the origin, historical context and contemporary patterns of"asymmetric strategy", and then analyzed Toft's"strategic interaction"conception. Generally, Toft's"strategic interaction"is relatively new and explanative. Being an important starting point for this research, Toft's"strategic interaction"perspective still leaves us with some questions: Firstly, Toft's analysis on the four types of strategy is too far-fetched; Secondly, Toft deliberately evades the question of a strategic choice in his theoretical model; thirdly, the argument"time is conducive to the weak rather than the strong side"is not convincing.This dissertation holds that the explanation"time is conducive to the weak rather than the strong side"is not enough. We must introduce a"cost"concept and answer: why the asymmetric strategies adopted by the weak can deprive the strong of the war inclination, and ultimately resulting in its abandonment of the war? The dissertation reviewed the dual trends and their logic of limited and unlimited violence in the history of the war. And then based on asymmetric structural characteristics of the involved parties'purposes and means, clarifying several important concepts of rules, cost, game and adaptation, there is a detailed analysis on"cost control"carried out by the both sides. This dissertation argues that the unlimited violence is the reason for the weak winning. On the one hand, the asymmetry in the interests of both parties leads to their different attitudes towards violence means, which propels the weak to use asymmetric strategies; On the other hand, the increasingly internet-based and globalizing features of non-State party and the development of science and technology endow asymmetry strategy with the possibility of winning. In general, compared to the strong, the weak has a certain advantage in cost control, and has a flexible adaptability. It is for this reason that contemporary asymmetrical conflict has become a serious trouble to the hegemonic power. In order to illustrate the inherent logic, this dissertation uses the"Afghan war"(1978-1989) and the"Iraq war"(2003-2007) for proof.Through studying the phenomenon of"defeating a strong enemy", we found that the asymmetry of the conflict to a large extent is the result of the tradeoff between the"coexistence logic"and"common-death logic". This conclusion is heuristic to our understanding of power politics and hegemonism, and yet we should also have a vigilant attitude toward the inherent violence of strategic asymmetry. In fact, the spread of the"new war"in the international society has alarmed the international society, and the academia need further study in this field.