From "the Politics Of Distribution" To "the Politics Of Production"

The basic characteristic of China transformation is regarded as"the state evacuated from the economic area and release the market power". The state's evacuation means two points: firstly, the control way of state has been changed and the interest distribution way is also different with the old one; secondly, for the social member, the protection of state is disappearing. This not only means the central government's plan control way has a big change, but also means the ideas and the other institution arrangement of the state's protection are absent. In the process of transformation, the market power's release will set the logic of"competition and substitute", what is embedded in the market power, free. This will re-construct the social interest distribution way and lead to many kinds of conflict and contend around the marketization. I chose the Danwei politics as the research topic because the reform of the SOEs in China follow the rule of transformation, the relationship between the state, the Danwei and the social individual will be very complex and interesting.The forepassed research about this topic has the deficiency, which is as follows: firstly, among the production, the historical comparative research is seldom. The productions focus on the macro-institution, namely the whole regime of Danwei. They were seldom focus on the process of the political conflict behind the Danwei organization's marketing transformation. And secondly, they often emphasize the face of Danwei's political and social characteristic, but ignore the face of Danwei's product function. I think that the Danwei is consisting of three closely related kind of face, namely the political, social and economic characteristic. These tree kinds of characteristic are triunity. Many of the Danwei's action are as the part of the national stratagem. The historical evidence tell us that the way of"Danwei Ban Shehui"was to keep the factory's product order and to satisfy the need of industrialization. So our study on the Danwei politics should not ignore the production politics. Thirdly, much of the research work are mainly to conclude the type of Danwei politics, they are seldom to look for the cause of Danwei politics and the change of their type. Even some of the research touched upon the mechanism of causation, but because of the limitation of the interpretation, which was mainly based on the rational choice theory, many of the conclusions were wrong.The marketization of Danwei organization is a course that means the state reduces the direct intervention in the labor process. The action of Danwei is getting more and more rationalization. This has two handles: firstly, in the age of the plan economy, the Danwei organization used as a tool to realize the industrialized strategy by the state. Most of the Danwei's actions was organized around the law of"anti-interest". The labor management belonged to the paternalistic regime. The agreement that the workers signed with the Danwei was a kind of social contract. Secondly, in the reform era, the labor relation between state and workers transited from social contract to market contract. The labor management follows the law of market and quest for the interest. This is the background in which Danwei politics was produced and changed. Danwei politics includes two types, one is called"distribution politics", which is around the resource and interest distribution. The other one is defined as product politics, which is happened in the labor process and around the relation in the production. This dissertation addresses three question as follows: firstly, I draw upon historical comparative studies on Danwei politics. Secondly, find the institution factors which cause the different Danwei politics types. Thirdly, based on the conception—institution complementarity, this dissertation want to address a classic sociological topic, which is"how the structure shape the agent's choice?"The reform leads to the change of the regime of Danwei governance. There are three kinds of governance institution systems, namely liberal market economies, coordinated market economies and plan economies. The competitive relationship between the Danwei(corporate) organizations and the labor management institution in different market arrangement context are also different. The system of corporate governance is a complex configuration, which is made of varied institutions. These institutions build up a field. The outcome of institution complementarity is reached by the institutional interaction. If one of the institutions was altered, the other institutions, especially the adjacent institution arrangements will also be affected. A new situation of institutional interaction is created, which leads to the institution change and conflict. The interest politics is the main expressional form.We can't regard China economy as liberal market economies, but the reform rule obviously inclined to the law of liberal market. The reform of Danwei is aim to marketed the organization and workers. The marketed institutions include, for example, the laid-off institution, labor contract system and construction of the labor market. The inter-institutional conflicts lead to the Danwei politics transition from distribution politics to production politics. As the case story shown, the model of the optimal efficiency is only theoretic. The interest politics that are produced around the mentoring relationship in SOEs show us that the agent political action usually includes three levels of means: firstly, the interactive relationship between the various institutions. Secondly, the interactive relationship between the institution and agent. Thirdly, the interaction between different agent. This is a kind of structuring process, which belongs to the political economy process and can't be explained by the abstract rational incentive principle.Obviously, all of the political actions are the outcome of the agent's choice. But the biggest difference between the historical institutionalism of economic sociology and the rational choice theory is that the former one focuses more on the formation of the preference than the later one. The historical institutionalism of economic sociology thinks that the rationality is constructed by the social institution: Firstly, their definitions of institution are different. The former regards institution as a action context, but the later regard the institution as a tool of tactic. Secondly, the historical institutionalism emphasizes the contextual constraint and regards institution as a determinant of choices and preferences. Thirdly, the rational choice theory emphasizes the agent's calculating, but the historical institutionalism of economic sociology thinks that the study should combine the agent action with the culture context. In belief, the historical institutionalism is opposed to the transcendental rational belief. So the historical institutionalism insists that we should use the dynamic way to study the institutional change, the processing method is very useful. Based on the interactive relationship between the structure and the agent, the scholars of historical institutionalism are to study the institutional change's whole process and outcome. The action logic of agent belongs to the appropriate reaction, it is not the maximize process. Historical institutionalism insists on the semi-determinism. They think that the institution has the dual nature: when the institution is stable, they are independent variable, which shapes the politics and policy. When the institution come to change, they are dependent variable, which will be shaped by the politics and policy. This is the theoretic meaning.This dissertation's reality meaning is to show us the non-market governance mechanism's important feature to the economic order and industry relationship in factory. The capitalism political economy thinks that the non-market governance mechanism is aim to protect the society. In general, when the liberal market mechanism doesn't work, the non-market mechanism will work as the supplement. Karl Polanyi called them double movement, namely the movement between the self-regulating market and the social protection. But how the double movement is going on?What's the interactive form between the market and the non-market mechanism? There are many different ideas about these questions. The economic neo-liberalism claims that the non-market mechanism is de-commercialize, it can strengthen the workers'power,but weaken the capital's power. This situation will lead to the politics against markets, which blight the market institution's performance. However, many domestic scholars overly emphasize the social protection as an opposed action against markets. My study in this dissertation provides a new approach that the market mechanism and the non-market mechanism can be close match and the arrangement also has a good performance. I believe that this conclusion is of an significance to the construction of the innovative state and the harmonious society.