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On Vertical Allocation Of State Power In Contemporary China

Posted on:2010-08-13Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:G H RenFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360275467583Subject:Marxist theory and ideological and political education
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The relationship between central and local governments is always a key problem of state system in the long history of human beings. It is related to the unification of a country, integration of its nation, development of domestic economic and stability of society. The concrete embodiment of the relation between central and local governments is the power relation between national central institution and local state organs. And it is also an issue in vertical allocation of state power. Since the horizontal allocation of state power is not comprehensive, which makes it is necessary to allocate power vertically. The vertical allocation of state power is a up-and-down power structure between central and local governments, or between a provincial government and its subordinate institutions. A republic can establish different administratively leveled governments either from above or from below, so as to allocate power among them. The vertical allocation of state power takes into account the allocation principle, political system and allocation manner. No wonder the importance of it is no less than the horizontal allocation's.As the trend of the vertical power allocation all over the world shows, more and more countries have abandoned the idea of either thoroughgoing centralization or decentralization. A more common pracice is that a nation should analyse the relation between its central and local governments and then keep equilibrium between centralization and decentralization. Since the reform and opening-up, a series of important adjustments have been made to the vertical power relation in China, which have achieved clear effects, promoting the development of economy and society nationally. But it worth noting that there still are many protrudent contradictions and problems. In fact, China has not stepped out of the strange loop of"delegating power and then taking power back". In contemporary China, in view of the important relation between central and local governments in the national political life, and the non-standard and non-institutionalization of vertical allocation, it is very urgent to find a reasonable equilibrium point between centralization and decentralization, then on its basis to construct a democratic, efficient, and vigorous vertical allocation system of state power.This paper uses the situation of modern China as the jumping-off point. Meanwhile, it organically combines the horizontal decentralization of power within the system of the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers with vertical decentralization of power between the central government and local units. Furthermore, starting with the network structure of the dual and three-dimensional decentralization of power, and anlysing with the development, evolvement and difficulties of the vertical distrubition of state power in the mordern China, especially during the thirty years'reform and openning-up, the article searches for the future reformatonal direnction of the vertical distrubition of state power and its systematized project design.The allocation of state power is five-dimensional. Firstly, the allocation of state power between people and state organs is an issue of state system in politics and constitutional jurisprudence which establishes the ownership of proprietary. Secondly, the allocation of state power lies between minority and majority in the form of representative system in modern countries. Thirdly, the horizontal allocation of state power means allocating power among state organs in line with different functions. It is a form of government with three branches, namely, legislative, executive and judicial organs. Fourthly, the vertical allocation of state power is the power pattern between the central and local governtments or between a provincial government and its subordinate institutions. The horizontal allocation of state power is not comprehensive, which makes it necessary to allocate power vertically. Fifthly, it is the allocation between state and society. As the state power comes from society, it should return to society in turn.The theory of centralization, decentralization, local autonomy and averaging weight between the central and local governments is the basic theoretical formation in vertical allocation of state power. The view of centralization and decentralization, and the theory of state structure of Marx, Engels, and Lenin have important theoretical guiding significance to the vertical allocation of state power in contemporary China. The three generations of communist leaders in China, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and the new central collective leadership have paid more attention to the relation between the central and local governments, presenteding thoughts and theories significant for the vertical allocation of state power in contemporary China.There always are close linkages between the vertical allocation of state power and the state structure. The vertical allocation of state power has two forms, that is, unitary system and federalism. Unitary system tends to centralize power and federalism tends to decentralization. But the unitary system does not equal to absolute centralization while federalism does not equal to absolute decentralization either. Among them, the allocation model of unitary system contains power centralization and autonomous model in practice. Meanwhile, the allocation model of federalism contains decentralization and power centralized model. A choice of them should be made according to the different national structure of a specific country. Extensive administrative reforms have taken place in western countries since 1980s. The theme of reforms is rebuilding the relation between central and local governments. In the process of interaction between state power and structure, there is a tendency to centralize and decentralize power, which exists and goes together. A special model of state structure has been formed in contemporary China which combines features of unitary system and federalism. To be specific, there are three models, that is, the power allocation model between the central government and general administrative regions, the power allocation model between the central government and regional autonomy of minority nationalities, and the power allocation model between the central governmetn and special administrative regions.The evolution of vertical allocation of state power can be devided into two stages: the establishment of macro-framework in history and the development during reform and opening-up. Manyfolded systematic dilemmas have come up, including power centralization lack of authority, continuous power expansion in local governments short of conficence, cross-boundary administration and omission due to unclear division of power between the central and local governments, lack of expression and balancing mechanism of local interests, the non-balance and polarization of power allocation, non-institution of the power allocation model, imperfect supervision mechanism of vertical allocation, and so on. For vertical allocation of state power, either absolute centralization or decentralization is an extreme expression of power allocation with obvious disadvantages. It is impossible to implement thorough-going decentralization or centralization in China. A more reasonable practice is to build a dynamic balance mechanism for limited centralization and moderate decentralization.The allocation of legislative power between the central and local governments is the core of the vertical allocation of state power, which decides the shape of power allocation and basic relation pattern between the central and local governments. If the legislative power can be allocated properly, a well-ordered, efficient and healthy power operation will come true. If not, it can cause harms, especially internal confusion in legislative system, for example, tort legistation and ultra vires activities, duplication of the legislative, regional protectionism and trade barrier preventing the unification of domestic market and national legal system. Furthermore, it can lead to conflict of competence between the central and local governments, political conflicts, local rebellion or even regime change. So, every country has been placing emphasis on legislative competence, especially the allocation between the central and local governments. And they have tried to improve factors effecting the authorization configuration, through reasonable models, methods and principles of allocation, so as to ensure effective operation of state power, promote political stability, economic development, national unity, and unify the country.It is impossible for state administrative authority to concentrate completely on central governments. State power should be divided scientifically between the central and local governments. In substance, it involves administrative divisions and government levels which are the crux of the administrative system in a country and shapes the spatial distribution and operation mechanism of administrative power between the central and local governments. For example, China has a five-levelled protection administrative power system that has serious drawbacks. According to the evolution of government levels in China and practices in other countries, the fundamental solution for redressing abuses is to reduce the area of a provice, increase the number of provinces, add municipalities directly under the central government, build reasonable administrative regional management levels, reduce middle levels and abolish township governments. Under the multi-levelled government system, different functions are given to government at different levels in order to realize the aimed governance. And administrative rights should be decomposed according to functions. While administrative rights come true on the basis of financial rights, financial division have to be made according to administrative rights. The key here is to divide the administrative and financial rights between the central and local governments rationally.In jurisprudence, in a unitary constitutional system in China, judicial power falls into authority of state with no hint of local autonomy, therefore, a local government has no judicial power apart from legislative and administrative power. The localization of judicial power in present China has effected legal unification and trial independence which are the most important constitutional principles in our country. And it has posed a threat to socialist principles of rulling by law. Problems in the localization of judicial power should be considered in the light of relation between the central and local governments. To optimize the allocation of judicial authority is the next reform step. In fact, localization of judicial power is due to abuses in judicial system, accordingly, the solution lies in reforming the judicial system. Specifically, the court system should be rearranged, jurisdiction and administrative division be separated, the tribunal financial management system and selection mechanism for judicial officials be reformed, too.
Keywords/Search Tags:state power, vertical, allocation, centralization, decentralization, institutionalization
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