| The earnings management causes the accounting information not to be objectively and fairly reported and investors to be misleaded. Finally earnings management seriously impacts the effective allocation of capital market resources. Therefore it's necessary to limite and constraint earnings management. There are lots of factors that have impacts on earnings management. This dissertation studies the methods to measure the level of earnings management in the context of managerial risk preference, and tries to find how managerial risk preference affects the degree of earnings management. Then based on the dual principal-agent relationships, this dissertation proposes earnings management constraint model.This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 gives an introduction on the research background, significance, contents and the technical route. Chapter 2 shows literature review, which summarizes the relative studies on managerial risk preference, earnings management, and the relationship between them. Based on existing researches, an evaluation model of earnings management is constructed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 establishes a comprehensive evaluation system of managerial risk preference, and measures Chinese listed companies'managerial risk preference. Chapter 5 empirically tests the influence of managerial risk preference on earnings management of listed companies. Starting with the dual principle-agent relationship which exists in Chinese listed companies, Chapter 6 constructs an optimization model for the income of managers, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and then constructs earnings management constraint model in the perspective of managerial risk preference, which provides the theoretical foundation for constraining earnings management behaviors. Chapter 7 is conclusions and prospects of the dissertation. The main conclusions are as following:(1)The evaluation model of earnings management is constructed to measure Chinese listed companies'earnings management level.The desynchronized between company's resources flow and the confirming of profit provides chances for earnings management. The dissertation is based on the relationship of different account titles in financial statements, multidimensional evaluation model of earnings management degree is constructed from asset pricing and expenses confirmation. The model reveals the desynchronized between company's resources flow and confirming of profit, and realizes the valuation of earnings management on the dimension of business credit, inventory, non-current business assets, expenses and so on, and the comprehensive evaluation of earnings management level, thus solves the problem that view the factors of earnings management as "black box" in accruals model. The study finds that, the companies engaging in positive earnings management are more than those engaging in negative earnings management; however, companies engaging in positive earnings management show a trend of decreasing during 2007-2009(except the dimension of expenses).(2)The comprehensive evaluation system of managerial risk preference is constructed, and the managerial risk preference of Chinese listed companies is measured.The characteristic of managerial risk preference can be reflected by his decision-making in life and work. According to the manager's decision-making, the dissertation chooses indexes of six aspects to construct the comprehensive evaluation system of managerial risk preference, such as asset structure of the manager and the company, the source of the asset, the debt term structure, the matching relationship between financing and investment, the source of the profit and so on. Based on this, the dissertation constructs the risk preference comprehensive evaluation model and employs principal component analysis to assess the degree of listed companies'managerial risk preference in different environment, which makes up the limitation of expected utility function theory in application. The study shows that, the managerial risk preference of Chinese listed companies is lowest in 2008 and appeares to have an initial ascent after a decline trend.(3) Managerial risk preference's influence over earnings management is empirically tested.This dissertation measures Chinese listed companies' earnings management and managerial risk preference in 2007-2009, and makes further analysis of managerial risk preference's influence over earnings management. The empirical research reveals that managerial risk preference has a significant effect on earnings management, namely, the higher managerial risk preference is, the higher degree of earnings management is. Compared with small and medium enterprises, managerial risk preference has more significant effect on the degree of earnings management in large enterprises. Compared with state-owned enterprises, managerial risk preference has more significant effect on the degree of earnings management in private-owned enterprises. Based on different dimensions of earnings management, managerial risk preference has a significant positive effect on earnings management in corporate inventory dimension, non-current assets dimension, and orporate expense dimension respectively, that is to say, the higher managerial risk preference is, the higher degrees of earnings management in above three dimensions are. (4) Based on the dual principal-agent relationships, the earnings management constraint model is constructed from the perspective of managerial risk preference.On the basis of the dual principal-agent relation between managers and shareholders, this dissertation reveals the cost and reward of all the stakeholders'behaviors in the context of managerial risk preference. According to the expectations yield function of shareholders and managers, we creats the revenue optimization model of stakeholders and discusses the influencing factors on their degree of behaviors. Thus this dissertation proposes earnings management constraint model from the perspective of managerial risk preference and offers the theoretical foundation for restraining corporate earnings management behaviors. The models show that, when the risk of being investigated and dealed with is high, managers with high level of risk preference will restrain the earnings management degree by themselves while the rent-seeking and sharing degree of controlling shareholders is decreased with the level of managerial risk preference ascending. And the higher managerial risk preference is, the minority shareholders need to go ahead with stronger supervision. |
