The Studies On Different Incentive Mechanism And The Funds-performance In China

This paper demonstrates the optimal incentive behavior based on investment fundmanager 's performance from the finance marketing view point. In our country, thefund investment industry is the need of the market development with the financial andinvestment. People's financial need promotes the professional investors agent investmentforms, highlights the professional investors entrusted financial management of necessityand feasibility. In the process, the development of the fund and fund managers incentiveproblems, are always investors and academic circles the most concern.The mutual fundpick fixed mange-fee based on its net assets within 3% and 5% every day,and thesefee balances once a month as income.According to extract to settle accounts,management fee becomes fund company operation management fund source of income.In this context, private equity fund to folk fund managers incentive used moreperformance of commission stimulation, namely fund managers of the income from themanagement asset appreciation, part of the managers and investors earnings tightlytogether, this kind of incentive the strength of the way significantly greater than the fixedfee model.This paper tries to research for the fund manager incentive study provide empiricalsupport, help investors identify different incentive mode fund performance advantagesand disadvantages, as the type of private equity fund trust system consummation provideempirical support, encourage for China's fund managers develop a broader careerdevelopment space. The first chapter of introduction, the article introduces the research background, the studyof the definition and the innovative points.The second chapter is part of literature review, mainly reviewed the different type of fundof incentive mechanism of development, this paper introduces the hedge funds andprivate equity funds of the present situation of China's sun, summarizes the domestic andoverseas scholars of fund managers incentive mechanism research; Combed theprincipal-agent theory and incentive fund, the relationship of further shows the reputationmechanism of fund managers incentive effect.The third chapter basically through the phone in the form of return visit to understand thepresent situation and the decision-making power fund manager incentive forms, and thetype of private equity fund trust operation of the description comb, and found that ourcountry's public enlisting fund manager with only part of the decision-making power, thesalary system considering management by the company the size of the fund, and relativeperformance, absolute performance, risk control, after many indices, set salary appraisalsystem; Trust private equity fund the type most Co., LTD or limited partnership system,fund managers and main investment decisions of the sponsors or partners for enterprise,has the company residual claims, can effectively reduce the agency cost. Because of this,the trust private equity fund in China in recent years type for thriving development, alsogot the identity of investors.After a lot of information collection, then we will public enlisting fund managers and privateequity fund manager of the type of the trust of the utility function are united setting, bychanging the parameters of the equation for different forms of incentive mode. Throughthe mathematical derivation proposed hypotheses, think a high performance of theincentive model can make for investment ability of fund managers improve fundperformance, improve investor returns, but at the same time also can bring higher risk.The fourth chapter of different incentive mode is the public offering funds and privateequity funds earnings, risk, after risk-adjusted returns, beyond performance benchmark earnings and contrast research index, we found that the high performance of the trust ofthe extraction for private equity fund manager type fund performance in the inspectionperiod was superior to public offerings of new fund, but individual private equity fundmanager risk control ability is bad, provided investors with the loss. After risk adjustments,trust type private equity fund shows still superiority, not only over the public enlisting fund,also greatly surpass market benchmark.We have to trust company independent management funds, and the use of the base ofthe fund, the incentive for public enlisting fund performance of three different operationmode of fund performance analysis, found the same is the fund manager adoptedadditional incentive mode, the management of the company independent from the trustfund performance was better than the other two types of public offerings of new fund, thefund manager that in addition to the incentive mechanism is the important factors affectingfund performance, but also other factors need to us for further study.Chapter 5 is the fund manager's stock selection ability and timing capability evaluation.We used the TM model and HM model to compare the differences of two kinds of funds,and the probability of success for the first time method for the auxiliary validation; At thesame time for different operation system of the fund detailed comparison.TM model of private equity fund manager that trust and public offering type fundmanagers are embodied in not obvious positive stock selection ability and negative timingcapability (not obvious), but trust private equity fund manager of stock selection ability isobviously superior to public offering fund manager, and an ability to both differ little; HMmodel found both reflects not obvious positive stock selection ability, private equity fundtrust type reflects not obvious positive an ability, public enlisting fund appear not obviousnegative an ability, but private equity fund manager's timing capability is better than thepublic enlisting fund manager, but the stock selection ability both are not significant.Overall, private equity fund manager investment ability is better than the public enlistingfund manager. When we use successful probability method of auxiliary validation, found that twoincentive mode to the direction of the fund manager market forecast and judgment basicquite, public enlisting fund manager also slightly better. The results of the comprehensivebefore and after, we believe that China fund industry investment ability of fund managersdo not have significant differences, the key lies in the investment performance differencesto position and the control of the flexibility of the strategy.Chapter 6 different incentive mode proved the fund performance of persistent, mainlyadopts cross product ratio index fund sample to the overall analysis, and persistentdivided into monthly performance, half a year and three times, to gauge fund short-term,medium-term and long-term performance persistent; And at the same time we withdifferent operation system using the correlation coefficient of fund inspection, check list ofthe fund persistent characteristics.Short-term (monthly) and long-term (annual) to see, both without risk adjusted earnings,sharpe index and Jensen index, public enlisting fund returns are higher than those of thetype of the continuity of the trust private equity fund; And the middle (half a year)investigation, public offering funds and private equity fund trust type the continuity andreverse characteristics are more apparent.ZhangCai 7 with regression analysis method, the influence factors of the fundperformance incentive mode of significant uncertainty do analysis of the choice of fundperformance and adopted without risk adjusted earnings, sharpe index and Jason index.Choose the fund manager working time, sex, education, background, and the size of thefund management and so on several variables as the control variables, with the multipleregression way verification, found that, without the risk adjustment in earnings, or fundsharpe index and Jensen index, are the significant influence factors incentive mode, so asto prove the basic premise of the study.Overall, this paper through the careful research, found that: 1. The trust of the overall performance of private equity fund better than the publicenlisting fund, from September 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010, the investigation of the period,private equity fund average income is higher than the general public offerings of newfund;2. Type trust private equity fund manager overall risk control slightly inferior to the publicenlisting fund, which reflect the variance of significant gains greater than the publicenlisting fund, part of the private equity fund manager do not have steady consistentinvestment strategy and risk control ability, can be in high value under the temptation ofβinvestment risk, to investors with a loss;3. Excellent private equity fund manager in the fund management operation in the upperoverall advantage of, the fund manager from over a long period of time, a goodinvestment ability training, have very mature stable investment ideas;4. Public offering of the background of the fund manager of fund management whetherabsolute returns, relative benefits, go beyond the market index, risk control, show beyondthe average level of the private characteristics, are in the whole China's assetmanagement industry the most high-end.Finally, we believe that China's current fund industry development stage in order to obtainthe decision not only high income and no temperance increase the investment risk, butneed to encourage multi-level fund managers incentive mode, so we think can from thefollowing three aspects to try1. The current public enlisting fund management company established in the multi-levelincentive model,2. Establish a company type fund company,3. Try to existing private equity fund industry as the foundation, establish federal fundcompany.