Game Analysis Of China's Listed Companies In Mergers And Acquisitions

As for the M&As of listed companies, any reached deal is the game result of participated parties. With different forms of M&As, there exist different game behavior rules, different utility function of participated parties, different connotations for the eventually reached equilibrium solutions. This dissertation firstly analyses the forms of M&As of Chinese listed companies; then within the given policy framework, sets up the game model based on participating agents and solves the equation, gets the equilibrium solution; after that, the policy suggestion concerning enhancing the efficiency of M&As is proposed. In the end, an overall evaluation on the discussed four kinds of M&A manners is proposed, an analysis and judgment is given on the evolution of the manners of Chinese listed companies concerning the current status of Chinese securities market.The structure and the main contents of this dissertation are as following:Chapter 1 illuminates the concept of merger & acquisition, compares and contrasts the two concrete concepts of merger and acquisition. In this chapter, a review of relevant literature home and abroad is also presented. And then, the aimed topic of this dissertation is presented.Chapter 2 is about merger & acquisition of administrative allocation. This method is dominant in the preliminary stage of Chinese security market, where governmental behavior manner has a direct impact on the process and effect of corresponding merger & acquisition. Owing to there existing no market transaction behavior and there existing severe default in Chinese political regime, the gaming of merger & acquisition of administrative allocation lies in the rent seeking—supervision game between managers of listed companies, local governmental officers and supervising departments. By building and solving of such a game model,...