Research On The Theoretic Models Of Firm Merger

Firm merger has recently become one of the most important strategies for modern firms and multinational firms to expend and improve their competitive strength and outmatch their rivals. Meanwhile, firm merger also becomes a strategic fool for a country to adjust industry structure and guarantee social welfare. Hence, we synthetically apply the theory of industrial organization, game theory and welfare economics, and present a model to examine the incentive and social welfare of firm merger based on the oligopoly market.In Chapter One, the research background and significance are introduced. Besides, the relative research fields are briefly reviewed, and the paper's framework and main content are summarized.In Chapter Two, the incentive and social welfare of horizontal mergers are studied in three aspects: first, the profitability and social welfare of horizontal merger are studied based on linear demand and asymmetric constant marginal costs of production in generalized Stackelberg market; second, we study the external effects that the preemptive merger firm implements a two-stage staggered competition strategy within it, and show how the profitability and social welfare of merged firms will change when followed merger behavior occurs based on a symmetric oligopolistic industry; finally, the strategic merger incentive of two groups of firms are studied based on an asymmetric oligopolistic industry. These conclusions provide a partial solution to the merger paradox and merger wave.In Chapter Three, based on market foreclosure, the incentive and effect of vertical mergers are studied in three aspects: first, provided with the different strategic power of the downstream firms and the existence of the complete market foreclosure in the industry, we study the determinant factors contributing to profitability of vertically integrated firms and equilibrium industry structure; second, we examine the profitability and social welfare of vertical merger by assuming that the existence of complete market foreclosure in the intermediate market is endogenous andan upstream incumbent faces a potential entry threat; finally, pricing of intermediate product within a vertically integrated firm is analyzed.In Chapter Four, we analyze rather complex and practical merger behavior among firms when the upstream and downstream enterprises are simultaneously capable of horizontal and vertical merging as strategies variables. In the analysis, special emphasis is laid upon distinguishing idiosyncrasy and behavior characteristics among firms. Furthermore, the decision to merge across or within stages of production is treated as endogenous. And whether the vertically integrated firm will implement complete market foreclosure strategy in intermediate market is also treated as endogenous. These conclusions are beneficial to the government's correctly understanding and conducting firms'merger behavior.In Chapter Five, we give a conclusion to the paper and discuss the further research orientation.The papers'innovation in relation to research fields has the following:(1) Theoretical explanations are offered regarding to the occurrence of horizontal merger behaviors without Cost Synergy, even the merger wave in many industries.(2) The profitability and social welfare of horizontal merger between asymmetric firms are studied in a generalized Stackelberg market.(3) In a sequential oligopoly industry, we analyze the determinant factors which affect a vertically integrated firms'profitability and equilibrium industry structure by considering the downstream firms'strategic power.(4) As for a vertically integrated firm, the determining method and policy dynamic consistency of the transfer pricing of intermediate product within are analyzed.(5) When the upstream and downstream enterprises can take the horizontal and vertical merging as strategy variables, we distinguish the firms'different idiosyncrasy and behavior characteristics, and then analyze rather complex and practical merger behavior among different firms.