Chinese Commercial Banks Reluctance To Lend Behavioral Research

Since last century 80's, China has been performing a gradual reformation from planned-oriented economy to market-oriented economy, entering the economic transition period, along with economic reformation, so loan behaviour of Chinese commercial banks have had great transformation. There appeared the loan-cherishing behaviour that could not be explained by the planned-oriented loan theory and the western loan theory, which restricts loan function of promoting economy development. By studying the loan-cherishing behaviour and the loaning decision-making logic of Chinese commercial banks in the transition period, the foreseeability and systematization of the financial reform policy would be achieved, and it is theoretically and realistically meaningful.Using the western loaning behaviour theory and according to the facts of bank loan in the transition period, the dissertation studied the system producing loan-cherishing behavior and formed an analytical model for the loan-cherishing behaviour adapting to reality and environment in the transition period, and tested results of the model in practice. Moreover, the dissertation put forward measures improving the surrounding of loaning decision of Chinese commercial banks.The dissertation researched on following aspects:First, this dissertation researched in depth features, reviewed history evolution, and thoroughly analyzed factors and main characteristics of the loan-cherishing behavior of Chinese commercial banks in the transition period; furthermore, it constructed the analytical framework suitable for the reality in the transition period.Second, this dissertation studied in depth internal factors leading to the loan-cherishing behavior of Chinese commercial banks. As to internal factors, the sharp turn of risk preference of China commercial banks has resulted in the distortion of the incentive and obligate mechanism of loan operators, which resulted in "loan-cherishing". Thus, by constructing the corresponding model, and respectively on macro-level and micro-level, the dissertation analyzed the important effect which the turn of risk preference has made to loan-cherishing behavior of Chinese commercial banks, and tested results of the model in practice.Third, this dissertation studied in depth external factors leading to the loan-cherishing behavior of Chinese commercial banks. Due to external factors, such as interest regulation, mortgage shortage, absence of information sharing system, a single bank is hard to design debt contract with discrimination equilibrium, insufficient incentive and constrains excessive, loan-cherishing behaviour is strengthened. Because of incompleteness of market competitive structure, small banks are inclined to imitate the loan behaviour of big banks in the game among banks, which results in more and more severe loan-cherishing behavior. Therefore, this research discussed the effects toward loan-cherishing of China's commercial bank in transition period, which results from interest rate regulation, collateral, law environment, credit information environment, and result of market competition. Moreover, the viewpoint is tested in practice.Finally, based on the summary of this research, the dissertation provided the countermeasures and suggestions that modify the loan-cherishing behavior: first, pushing the reformation of property mechanism in financial industry and improving the incentive and obligate mechanism; second, strengthening construction of collateral legal system and promoting efficiency of judicial agency; third, constructing a healthy credit information sharing system, and completing the credit system; fourth, advancing the market-oriented process of interest rate steadily and completing the risk compensation mechanism; fifth, promoting the commercial bank to diversify businesses and fostering the core competitive ability of commercial banks.The innovation points in this dissertation are as follows: first, with focusing on the unstable systematic factors in transition period, introducing a systematic theory of loaning behavior of Chinese commercial banks and discussing comprehensively the reasons, evolutionary rules and development trends of the loan-cherishing behavior; second, constructing an analysis model with internal and external layers, studying factors that affect the loan-cherishing behavior by employing the model; third, summarizing the risk preference variance factor as the fundamental internal element that leads to the irregular loaning behavior of China commercial bank, and as supplement to the theoretical blind-point of modern western loaning behavior theory when analyzing the practice in China; fourth, from analysis of external factor, by linking each external factor toward risk preference and responding credit incentive mechanism, constructing the analyzing model constituted by the interconnection between external factors, which provides an open analysis platform for adding new external factors in the future, and by utilizing the model, the unique effects that the external factors, such as interest rate regulation, made to the process of loan-cherishing is studied.