| The perfect information disclosing system is indispensable for the effective market restriction otherwise its function can not be exerted into full play. As far as market restraint and government supervision concerned, on the one hand, they are mutually replaceable: more market restriction will bring about less government supervising pressure; vise versa, more government supervising will correspondently result in restricting market restriction. On the other hand, they are supplementary and combinative, jointly constructing the relatively perfect bank external supervising system. The Market restriction and bank internal surveillance differ from their independence, degree of surveillance as well as their respectively expected objectives. However, harmoniously coordination and mutually supplementary function for their weaknesses can make our bank surveillance get twice the result with half the efforts.The Basel Committee, serving as the primary force of promoting market restriction, initially and formally put forward the effective market restriction as one of the three mainstays for the steady bank industry in the"New Capital Agreement"; establishing the bank information disclosure as one of the intrinsic requirements for the ensuring steady banking industry; considering enlarging information disclosure and strengthening market restriction as essential tools for bank supervision. Furthermore, more concrete requirements are brought forward in view of disclosing key issues, such as bank's capital structure, risk and capital status; the quantitative and qualitative information disclosing requirements are also stipulated with regard to application scope, capital structure, risk assessing and managing process, as well as the sufficient capital; simultaneously emphasizing the related integrative information disclosure. What's more, it is required that the supervising institutions should evaluate bank's disclosing system and promote the disclosing framework with unified criteria. Concretely speaking, as for the active large-scale banks, an information disclosure is required quarterly and also demanded in case of each significant event about market risk; concerning the general banks, an information disclosure is needed half the year.Comparably, the current bank accounting information disclosing system in our country is"hardly bearable"on account of multiple influencing factors, and the"Capital Agreement"in 1988 (i.e. Old Capital Agreement") is implemented by the our bank surveillance in view of the practical situation of our country. However, we should create conditions and implement the related provisions in the"New Capital Agreement"as soon as possible so as to move towards the international market, participate in the international competition, enhance the internal prestige, then managing the foreign capital bank in equal foundation. Therefore, our country has partially transmitted from"Commercial Bank Information Disclosure Trial Methods"and"Commercial Bank Capital Sufficient Rate Managing Methods"to"New Capital Agreement"respectively,and new requirements are put forward as for Commercial Bank's information disclosure, such as risk disclosure and risk cover. But actually the practical operation is not ideal. In view of these reasons, on the one hand, it is partially due to overemphasis on the government supervision and less market restriction; on the other hand, many reforms are involved in order to bring the market restriction into full play, which is an arduous project.Therefore, it is imperative to implement bank information disclosure in order to improve the efficiency of bank supervision. At the same time, in the process of disclosing the commercial bank information, there are many problems in the commercial banks, for example, what kind of information should be exposed, how to gather and process information, what kind of quality requirements should the exposed information achieve, how to establish the standard mechanism of disclosing information, as well as the regulation and coordination of the supervising and executive institutions of information disclosure, and the like problems which should be urgently solved, can't be treated partially or separately. So the bank accounting information market, as an important theoretical and practical proposition, is introduced in this thesis. The coordination between bank accounting information market and bank surveillance is worthy of a long-term systematical project. This is because that many problems, such as the agelong basic framework of bank accounting information mechanism, the economical and social foundation of bank accounting information, the inner functional mechanism between bank accounting information market and bank surveillance etc. need to be affirmed and studied so as to identify the fundamental unit or the analytical cell of China bank accounting information market, discover the logical pivot of coordination between bank accounting information market and bank surveillance, all of which can bring about the consistency between theoretical logic and historical logic about the study. Therefore, based on the requirements of"New Capital Agreement"for the bank accounting information disclosure, this thesis summarizes the systematic arrangement of bank accounting information market and bank surveillance from bank accounting information market practice by inductive and deductive methods, embarking from connective effects of bank accounting information market and taking the match of bank accounting information market and bank surveillance as the master line. Grounded on this, by referring to the"New Capital Agreement", the thesis reflects the practice of bank accounting information market of our country and proposes the conception of coordinating the bank accounting information market and bank surveillance from the static perspective, which aims to exploring the developmental tendency of coordinating bank accounting information market and bank surveillance.This thesis consists of six parts:Part One mainly deals with the theoretical analysis for the market and its bank surveillance, which serves the theoretical foundation for the whole study in this thesis. The vital significance of Effective Market Hypothesis to bank accounting information disclosure and the market malfunctions of monopoly, external economy effect, as well as public goods are both analyzed. Meanwhile, the asymmetrical information theories, as well as the asymmetry phenomena existing in the commercial banks, are also discussed in this part.In Part Two, first look is given to a series of new requirements of"New Capital Agreement"to the bank information, which include the following aspects: all kinds of risks confronted can be measured scientifically, confirmed and exposed promptly; The sufficient level of bank capital must fully reflect the bank credit risk, market risk, operation risk, fluid risk, interest rate risk, legal risk and so on; commercial banks are required to positively use the internal rating law (IRB) to appraise the risks, gradually make the supervising capital requirements and the economical capital requirements unify, and coordinate the capital sufficient level and bank practical risks by improving risk measurement and management. This part also elaborates the stipulation of"New Capital Agreement"about information disclosure scope, content, key issues and methods for commercial bank, establishing whether the commercial banks meet the needs of information disclosing requirements as one of the prerequisites concerning whether it is applicable for the commercial bank to adopt the IRB, especially the high-level IRB. At the same time, this part also expounds that the"New Capital Agreement"stipulates that the bank should promptly expose capital structure, capital sufficient rate, capital inner appraisal mechanism, risk forecasting and strategy management etc. Secondly, the author illustrates the instrumental value of bank accounting information disclosing mechanism in realizing bank surveillance. Then, the author explains the relationship market restriction and effect bank surveillance, proposes that effective bank information disclosure is the precondition of exerting market restriction and public information disclosure is the key of implementing effective surveillance. Only by strengthening market restriction can the effective surveillance for bank industry be implemented. Lastly, the feasibility and main obstacles of introducing information restriction into bank surveillance are elaborated.Part Three involves a comprehensive and systematical analysis about the unbalance phenomena of bank accounting information market. Meanwhile, it carries out the practical measurement for the current status of bank accounting information market. It mainly analyzes the multi and bank accounting information market, insufficient object, and imperfect mechanism, malfunction and unbalance Game Theory of market.Part Four, guided by the Coordination Theory, focuses on the illustration about the foundation of coordinating bank accounting information market and bank surveillance (market malfunction, incomplete law, bank risks), the start point of coordination, coordination motive, coordination cost and profit analysis. It also establishes and designs the coordination framework and notion.Part Five designs the market development of coordinating bank accounting information market and bank surveillance. On the basis of heavy and technological challenges of"New Capital Requirements"for producing, processing and providing bank accounting information, that is, a series of changes about traditional production and process methods about bank accounting information, the original unbalance existing in bank accounting information market will aggravate. The coordination of bank accounting information market should be tackled first in order to establish the new balance and meet the unilateral demands of bank accounting information. Therefore, this chapter mainly studies the coordinating development of bank accounting information market. It designs the constitutional elements and mechanism of bank accounting information market from the angle of coordinating bank accounting information market development so that market environment is created by coordinating bank accounting information market and bank surveillance.Part six designs the concrete measures of coordinating the bank accounting information market and bank surveillance based on the following kinds of coordination: coordination of producing and processing bank accounting information, coordination of bank accounting information disclosure, coordination of external supervision and internal mechanism construction, coordination of law construction, coordination of systematical construction about bank accounting information, coordination of bank accounting information and bank surveillance infrastructure construction, coordination of system arrangement.As for this thesis, four creative aspects are worth mentioning. First, it breaks the traditional framework of bank surveillance's requirements for bank accounting information of commercial banks. It studies the bank accounting information disclosure in the framework of bank accounting information market. By designing the bank accounting information market mechanism, the thesis elaborates how and what the commercial banks should do based on bank surveillance information requirements in order to realize the realistic accounting information disclosure of commercial banks, not reported by"requirement".Secondly, in accordance to"New Capital Accord"severe information constraints, the thesis systematically expounds a theory framework of coordinating bank accounting information market and bank surveillance, including coordinating contacting aspects, basis for coordinating, motives for coordination, philosophy orientation, etc.Thirdly, screening and reorganizing scientifically bank accounting information market with a systematical designing of bank accounting information market on a coordinating basis: constructing the operation mechanism, pricing model, supply and demand rational, main body building, supply and demand for information and gaming, etc. of bank accounting information market founding a basis for coordinating bank accounting information market and bank surveillance.Fourthly, the thesis designs the specific contents of coordinating bank accounting information market and bank surveillance. Corresponding to the non-harmonized aspects in bank accounting information market and bank surveillance demand, as far as the respects required by the coordination of bank accounting information market and bank surveillance is concerned, the paper sets up such coordinating strategies as, bank accounting information production criteria, process and disclosure standards, bank accounting information production and process technologies, bank accounting information disclosure, legal institutional environment, regulatory information platform, regulatory infrastructure construction and institutional arrangements, etc.On account of many factors, the imperfect consistence and standardization of bank accounting information material bring about some difficulties for the demonstration in this thesis, which is also one of the shortcomings of this thesis. With the improvement of bank accounting information market, the author will keep the track of bank accounting information market and remedy the shortcomings of this thesis to enrich the viewpoint and argumentation of this thesis.
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