| The essence of market entry is that it can make the factors the enterprise owns, such as capital, labor and technology, to transfer among different markets, regions and industries following profit induces. The market entry in banking industry means that the factors temporarily out of bank industry has the access to enter. An important background of our present banking reform is that we are undergoing banking market entry, which has the characteristics of "2+2+2". "2+2+2" means that our bank market entry has the substance as followings, two accessible models including founding new banks and participating in existed banks, both domestic and foreign investors has the access to our banking industry , both metropolis and non-metropolis can be invested in banking industry. Banking market entry is a comprehensive process combined with "2+2+2" modes, which should be regarded as "a basket of banking market access".This banking market access exerts important influence on China's banking reform and the whole economy development. Game theory is an important method to study market entry, but there is little research on our banking market entry. So the author chose this topic and tried to make a systematic and dynamic study on the problem from the perspective of game theory, considering the "2+2+2" characteristics.This dissertation gave new ides as following. Firstly, it proposed that our banking market entry has the "2+2+2" characteristics, and the characteristics of "2+2+2" are just the main line of the research. The author also pointed out the "2+2+2" is unbalanced. Secondly, on the base of researching on game behaviors in banking entry, the author recommended that we should draw up "moderate banking market entry" policy. Thirdly, the dissertation integrated some classical game models with China's banking entry practice, got some different conclusions from what we took for granted.The structure of dissertation's main body is compound. The game period is the body's horizontal thread , and the "2+2+2" is it's vertical content. According to this horizontal thread and vertical content, the author classifies the game behaviors as game behavior before entering, on entering , after entering and choosing game of two entry models. When studying game behavior before entering, the author unifies two entry models. When studying game behavior on entering, the author varies two entry models. When studying choosing game of two entry models, the author not only unifies three game period , but also unifies two entry models. The main game behavior before entering is the institutional changes. The dissertation puts forth a hypothesis of "three drive forces to put our banking entry's institutional changes", and conceives that the multi-coherence, interactive, and evolutionary game among central government , local government , incumbent bank and potential investors is just the force to put our banking entry's institutional changes.The main game behaviors on entering include "two-part-region game" and "entry-deterrence-barrier" game when the investors choose the "founding a new bank" model. And when the investors choose the "participating a founded bank" model, the main game behaviors on entering are included as "the incumbency's choosing participating partners game" , "dual-price game" and "bargaining game on stock pricing" between incumbency and investor .The author gets some interesting conclusion as following.As to "founding a new bank" model, domestic and foreign investors have their own and different advantages , we should give them equal rights to entry banking market. The government should make appropriate and transparent barrier to maximize our country's profit. It is unable or unnecessary for incumbent bank to do entry deterrence, and it is most important for them to take full use of their dominant advantage and improve their own competition ability as soon as possible.As to "participating a founded bank" model, we can say the domestic incumbency has the natural preference foreign capitals than domestic capitals. The idea that to learn foreign investor's advanced technology at the cost of cheaper price is not reasonable, when we sell our bank's equity to them at lower price, we are not only get fewer economy earnings, but also face more risk that foreign investors become speculators other than strategy investors. As to pricing mechanism of bank equity , auction may be better than bargaining for us. The government should control the pace of incumbency's selling equity in order to get more revenue .The main game behaviors after entering include "market segmentation game" and "deposit insurance institution game ". And when the investors choose the "participating a founded bank model", the main game behaviors after entering are both the participant's "game of acting as strategy investor or speculator" and "game of technology transfer". The last real effect of bank entry is depended on the game behavior after entering, so the researching on this behavior is vital. The dissertation conceives although the bank market is segmented temporarily , the competition will be more and more fierce with the transfer cost become less and less. In order to realize our attainment of introducing foreign investment ,we must meet their precondition, of which the most important is to give them more share or even give our control right to them . And the precondition is contrary to our finance security to some extent. Therefore, neither can we replace entry to domestic capital with entry to foreign capital, nor can we replace reform with entry.The game of entry model is also a choosing game among potential investors , incumbent banks and government. And all of them make their game strategy on the foundation of overall considering the game behavior of horizontal three period and vertical "2+2+2" content. The game of entry model is not only a trilateral interaction game, but also a single game of every party. The dissertation concludes that every party's choice is dynamically changed as the environment changes.On the foundation of analyzing these game behavior , the author evidently proposals that we should make "moderate banking market entry" policy. The dissertation holds that the "moderate banking market entry" should be a kind of adaptive openness to different investors out of banking industry ,which is should be designed in the consideration of whole economy. Firstly, it is based on appropriate freedom of banking market entry . Secondly , it means not only the degree of entry freedom is more and more higher gradually, but also the structure of entry freedom is more and more better to develop our economy. As far as the conclusion of the whole dissertation, the author suggests that "moderate banking market entry" is an optimal policy that can help us to change the "extensive and unbalanced bank entry " into "intensive and balanced bank entry ", and it will help us to realize our aim of sustainable development of finance in the end.
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