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The Research On Voluntary Disclosure Behavior In Chinese Listed Companies

Posted on:2008-11-30Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360215955224Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The voluntary disclosure by listed companies is the essential of capital market. This paper studies the choice of voluntary disclosure behavior of Chinese listed companies through normative and positive study methods. Based on the theoretic basis and system background discussion of voluntary disclosure behavior, this paper describes the general characteristics of voluntary disclosure behavior in Chinese listed companies, analyzes the three important issues of infective factors, economic consequences and investor relation, and constructs an analysis frame on voluntary disclosure behavior.There are 5 chapters:Chapter 1, the theoretic basis of voluntary disclosure behavior.This chapter is a theoretic explanation frame of voluntary disclosure behavior, including three levels. The first level is concept explanation basis. Based on the accounting information basic concept conversion from historic view to informative view, the voluntary disclosure behavior will produce more and more information, which meets the need of information demand. The second level is essential explanation basis, and it discusses the internal property of accounting information. The third level is mechanism explanation basis. Based on contract theory and signaling theory, this level explains the choice of voluntary disclosure behavior in some aspects, such as agency cost, private contract and signaling core abilities. Above three levels has constructed the theoretic explanation frame of voluntary disclosure behavior.Chapter 2, the system background and general characteristics of voluntary disclosure behavior.First of all, this chapter discusses the reason why capital market needs information disclosures. Due to the information asymmetry of capital market, information disclosure becomes the main method for investor protection. The mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure have internal connections. The mandatory disclosure is the basic demand of the market, and the voluntary disclosure is the extended demand of the market, which is more and more important. Secondly, this chapter analyzes the system background of voluntary disclosure behavior, and divides the system background into four stages. The first stage focus on mandatory information disclosure, the second stage focus on corporate governance information, the third stage focus on voluntary information disclosure, and the last stage focus on investor relation information. Thirdly, this chapter constructs a voluntary disclosure index (VDI) and uses this VDI to describe the current situation of voluntary disclosure behavior in Chinese listed companies. In the last, this chapter gives a primary explanation to the current characteristics, and concludes two reasons to explain the voluntary disclosure behavior in Chinese listed companies. One reason is the leading cause factor, which includes the motivations such as to show the company value and core abilities, to improve the financing abilities and to gain the control right earnings. The other reason is the resisting cause factor, which includes the cost of voluntary disclosure, business privacies and lawsuit risk. The resisting cause factor leads to the more cautiousness of voluntary disclosure behavior in Chinese listed companies.Chapter 3, the empirical study on the infective factors in voluntary disclosure behavior.Firstly, this chapter reviews the literatures in the infective factors in voluntary disclosure behavior home and abroad. In general, the voluntary disclosure behavior is affected by company size, stock concentration ratio, company performance, industrial differences and many other factors. After the literature review, this chapter brings forward a research design for Chinese listed companies. Based on the system background in China, this chapter divides the main infective factors into two groups: inside motivation factors and outside environment factors. According to the analysis, this chapter raised 6 hypothesis: (1) company size and voluntary disclosure behavior are positively correlated, (2) financial leverage and voluntary disclosure behavior are positively correlated, (3) company performance and voluntary disclosure behavior are positively correlated, (4) management stock ratio and voluntary disclosure behavior are negatively correlated, (5) broad structure and voluntary disclosure behavior are positively correlated, (6) audit authorities and voluntary disclosure behavior are positively correlated. Evidences show that when Chinese listed companies are making voluntary disclosure choices, their decision are seldom affected by financial leverage, company performance nor audit authorities. The company size, company performance and broad structure are the three main infective factors. Last, this chapter explains the conclusions and makes some suggestions.Chapter 4, the empirical study on the economic consequences in voluntary disclosure behavior.The voluntary disclosure behavior may have many economic consequences, including raising liquidity, earning more attentions and improving company values. However, all of these consequences can be revealed by the reduction of the equity capital cost. Many literatures based on foreign market indicate that there is a negative correlation between information disclosure level and equity capital cost. Is this conclusion available in Chinese market? This chapter studies the correlation between information disclosure level and equity capital cost based on the sample of 248 Chinese listed companies. Having the company size, financial risk, operation risk and B/M ratio as the four controlling variables, evidence shows that there is a negative correlation between information disclosure level and equity capital in Chinese market as well. This result provides direct evidence for the economic consequences in China, opens out the actual benefits for voluntary disclosure, and can help the decision making of Chinese listed companies and market supervisions.Chapter 5, the investor relation oriented voluntary disclosure strategy.Firstly, this chapter begins with a case study based on Wanke A (stock code 000002). According to this company's periodic reports and temporary reports, this chapter gives a detailed interpretation on the company's voluntary disclosure behavior. This individual study of Wanke A reveals an investor relation trend in the voluntary disclosure behavior of Chinese listed companies. Secondly, this chapter discusses the relation between investor protection and disclosure behavior. Due to the bounded rationality of investors and investor diversities, the ultimate issue in voluntary disclosure behavior is investor protection. Finally, this chapter predicts that the developing trend of voluntary disclosure behavior in Chinese listed companies is the investor relation oriented voluntary disclosure strategy.
Keywords/Search Tags:Voluntary disclosure behavior, Infective factors, Economic consequences, Investor relation, Voluntary disclosure strategy
PDF Full Text Request
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