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Analysis On The Exit Efficiency Of State-Owned Enterprises In The Gradual Transition Of Economy In China

Posted on:2008-03-01Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:S J XuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360215993979Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
From the economic performance point of view, the thesis that the efficiency of planned economy is lower than that of the market economy has already been widely accepted, and hence it has initiated the economic transition all around the world since the 1980s. In the transition countries, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been playing an important role in resources allocation in the former planned economy, and their behaviors have been influencing all the aspects in the national economic system. As a result, it is a core and crucial problem to reform the SOEs in the course of economic transition. Different from the main radical transition countries such as Russia, China's reform of SOEs has not deepened into the range of property rights until 1997. However, the exit proportion of SOEs is rather high up to now. For example, the accumulated exit proportion of the state-owned industrial enterprises is up to 75.02% by 2005.Then, why did the government choose the exit strategy of SOEs eventually in 1997 rather than remain the former model of reform without touching the property rights? What potential effects would appear in the course of SOEs'exit? What criterions, indexes and methods should be adapted to reasonably evaluate the exit efficiency of SOEs? In fact, answers to the questions as above closely relate d to the evaluation both about the reform of property rights in SOEs and the gradual transition as a whole in China. Therefore, this dissertation tries to make further research on the relationship between the SOEs'Exit and the gradual transition in China, explore the efficiency of SOEs'Exit in China. The main contents of this dissertation are as follows:First, a summary and evaluation of the researches on SOEs'Exit. Although the foreign scholars have touched upon the problems such as the causes and consequences of SOEs'Exit along with the choice of the optimal path, the course of economic transition and its influences on the reform of property rights of SOEs have not been fully thought. As a result, their researches on the meanings of SOEs'Exit and its comprehensive efficiency seem not to be entire. Meanwhile, although the causes of SOEs'Exit and its barriers analyzed by domestic scholars are more persuasive than those of the foreign scholars, there exits the tendency that substitute industrial efficiency or institutional transition efficiency for the comprehensive efficiency of SOEs'Exit. This dissertation holds that it's necessary to take circumstance of economic transition into account and make an all-round and positive analysis when evaluating the efficiency of SOEs'Exit.Second, dynamic causes of SOEs'Exit along with the positive connection of SOEs'Exit and economic transition. On the one hand, a utility function that the government holds the SOEs'property rights is structured, and the inside causes of the economic system of SOEs'Exit is illustrated by dynamically observing the tendency of SOEs'functions in providing economic surplus, creating state revenue and recruiting the urban labours. On the other hand, the outside causes of the economic system of SOEs'Exit is explained by considering the extreme evolution of the SOEs'governing model from"outsiders control"to"insiders control"and the SOEs'functions being replaced by NSOEs (non-state-owned-enterprises).Third, applicable evaluating criterion of SOEs'Exit efficiency. Based on over-all analysis on existing evaluating criterion of efficiency, this dissertation thinks that the applicable evaluating criterion of SOEs'exit efficiency should be the criterion of Costs-Returns, which mainly synthesizes the productivity criterion of Marxist economics and the minimum transaction costs criterion of Coase. When evaluating the returns of SOEs'exit, the productivity criterion of Marxist economics should be the main criterion and the improvement of social productivity should be emphasized. However, when evaluating the costs of SOEs'exit, the minimum transaction costs criterion of Coase should be the basis the benefit coordination of various cliques related to the SOEs'Exit should be stressed.Fourth, analysis on the potential consequences and the implications of SOEs'Exit efficiency. From the contractual approach point of view, the nature of SOE in China is a comprehensive system which embodies the contracts of producing, employment, social security and welfare. Thus, the potential consequences of SOEs'Exit should simultaneously appear in the aspects of returns and costs. The returns of SOEs'Exit involve the restructuring of SOEs, institutional employment migration, and the normalization of social security and welfare. At the same time, the costs of SOEs'Exit consist of frictional costs, implementing costs and lagging costs. As a result, the SOEs'Exit efficiency can be regarded as a comprehensive efficiency that can be divided into allocation efficiency and transaction efficiency, in which the former refers to the variety of the re-allocation of the stock resources and incremental resources, the latter refers to the smooth level of SOEs'under the background of institutional transition.Fifth, positive research on the efficiency of SOEs'Exit. According to the applicable evaluating criterion of SOEs'exit efficiency and the inherent implications of SOEs'Exit, along with taking the comprehensive efficiency into account, the dissertation positively proves the conclusion that both the allocation efficiency and transaction efficiency are rising, and the allocation efficiency is particularly remarkable. Therefore, the implementing of SOEs'Exit thoroughly shows the economic and social rationality of the government in the course of gradual economic transition in China.Sixth, the strategies of enhancing the SOEs'Exit efficiency by considering the realities of economic transition. In the perspective of the persistence of the SOEs'Exit and the necessity to make further efforts to enable the existing SOEs exit from the market, this dissertation researches on the market constraints and institutional constraints of SOEs'Exit, and advances the corresponding strategies to improve the SOEs'exit efficiency including pushing the market reform, deepening the institutional reform and short-term intervention by the government.
Keywords/Search Tags:Gradual Transition, State-Owned Enterprise, Exit, Efficiency
PDF Full Text Request
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