The Agency Mechanism Design Of Hydropower Stations In Electricity Market

With gradual deepening of the reform in the electric power system, exacerbation of energy shortage and environmental protection requirements, the optimizing deployment and making full use of hydropower resources are of great practical significance for the construction of a resource-saving and environment-friendly society, and have become more and more important for accelerating energy industry structure optimization and realizing sustainable development of electric power industry. Compared with thermal power, hydropower stations have different technical and economic characteristics. How to ensure optimized deployment of hydropower resources by electricity market competition is paid much attention by our researchers. The successful experiences of hydropower participation in foreign electricity markets are used for reference, and China's national conditions are considered, the dissertation focus on the bidding model of cascaded hydropower stations which belong to the same investment entity in electricity market, the agency mechanism design of cascaded hydropower stations which belong to different investment entities for electricity market competition, and the agency mechanism design of small hydropower stations for electricity market competition. The research achievement of this dissertation has a certain reference value on the mechanism design of ensuring efficient utilization of hydropower resources in electricity market.In electricity market, cascaded hydropower stations from the same investor will joint together to participate the market, and the objective function is maximizing the overall revenue of cascaded hydropower stations. In this case, a bidding model of cascaded hydropower stations considering reserve service in day-ahead market is presented in the dissertation. A hybrid algorithm that combines immune genetic algorithm and probabilistic simulation is proposed to solve the model.It is a common phenomenon that the investors of cascaded hydropower stations are different in China. When cascaded hydropower stations individually behave on behalf of their respective interests, the optimized deployment of hydropower resources will not be achieved. To deal with the problem, models used to analyze the low efficiency of cascaded hydropower resources and the market risk resulted from the asymmetric information between cascaded hydropower stations are established in the dissertation firstly, and a hybrid strategy which combines nonlinear complementarity method and probabilistic simulation is presented. Secondly, an agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations is designed to resolve the problem. Thirdly, the real option and bargaining model theory are used to analysis the equilibrium under the agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations, the equilibrium result verifies that the agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations which is proposed in the dissertation can achieve the Pareto Improvement of hydropower resources'deployment.Based on the features of small hydropower stations, an agency mechanism is designed in the dissertation to deal with market competition of small hydropower stations in some provinces which small hydropower stations have a big market proportion. The agency mechanism design of small hydropower stations is discussed in the dissertation. A supply function model considering uncertainty of inflows is proposed, and a mixed optimization strategy combined with stochastic simulation and greedy algorithm is applied to obtain the market gaming equilibrium. Numerical results verify the validity and the rationality of the agency mechanism.