Study On Incentive & Restraint Structure Of Listed Company

According to principal-agent theory, the separation of ownership and management in a modem corporate governance structure, principal and agents commissioned by the agency relationship between formations. In such relationships appointed in the pursuit of maximizing the return on clients and agents seek to maximize their effectiveness. Because of their goal vary, out of the client control, agents have a tendency to pursue the maximization of self-interest, resulting in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Collusion which is an agent or agents and other supervisors collude each other, by improper means to deceive clients or the public in order to profit from a social and economic phenomenon. Collusion will affect the country or the economic interests of outside investors, undermining the market economic order, affecting the function of the market in resource allocation. Thus, the listed company' collusion is a hot and difficult problem which is theory industry and government regulators pay attention to.With people's increasing awareness of collusion ,theory industry's research is ongoing in-depth, it should be said that the current study of how to prevent collusion has been relatively mature and improve, the measure of collusion-proof arrived is: 1, strengthen agent incentive;2,strengthen the agent binding; 3,raise collusion's transaction costs.In theory, with the increased intensity of incentives, collusion should be less, but the case did not appear in our country, we think that the main reason is that China's current incentive structure deviation.In the incentive structure, as indifference of operators' ideal incentive structure and listed companies' incentive structure, lead to managers' intrinsic motivation to rectify this disparity.In the constraints structure, because of the special nature of listed companies in China, China's listed companies have widespread "interior control.", This caused internal constraints ineffective, and China is in a period of economic transformation, and external constraints such as legal do not sound, internal and external constraints ineffective gave operators collusion opportunity.Therefore, the solution to correct the deviation of collusion incentive structure and constraints is the crux of the problem. In the incentive structure, the main encouraging means in China of the fixed compensation such as wages, bonuses, allowances and the incentive compensation such as CSO.Firstly, from the static perspective, the paper use indifference curve and budget line, on the basis of expanding operator's utility function, constructed an optimal incentive structure. Second, from the dynamic point of view, we study the problem of operator's optimal shareholders. Then we construct a dynamic model and take the wage-control into the principal-agent model .on the basis of operator's collusion and uncollusion cases, find the optimal level of shareholding and shareholders region. Consider internal constraints and external restraints are inadequate, put forward to a proposal which is consisting external restraints. Especially intensify the media supervision and legal supervision of the project. Finally, this article from the macro view on the optimal structure of the incentive and restraint. This article holds that the incentive and restraint mechanisms' imbalance about the operators will also affect their behavior which in turn will affect the company's performance. According to the optimal combination theory of inputs from elements , use the budget lines and indifference curve, we constructed an optimal structure of the incentive and restraint.The mainly innovation of article has several points as followed:(1)This article reference the content drive theory, the process incentive theory and the method, and expansion the operator's general utility function .the old literature regarding the guard plot research, is merely takes operator's utility function a whole, i.e. through enlarges operator's excitation density, increases its utility level, thus suppresses its incentive motive. But the general model has not served as the further analysis to agent's utility function. This article profits from the management science the content incentive theory, the processincentive theory and the method, divides it into two parts operator's utility function, expanded operator's general utility function. (2) This article reference the most superior factor inputs theory to construct a most superiorincentive structure, this article, in the foundation of the expansion to operator's general utility function, has analyzed the present two kinds of different means of incentive, and using the budget line and the non-difference curves, has constructed a guard plot most superior incentive structure from the static angle.(3)Constructed a hide-action moral hazard model, from the dynamic angle to analyze the collusion question. In this article, reference the request - proxy to drive that the theory entrusts - the proxy about the different information condition under to drive the mechanism analysis, has introduced the dynamic salary control variable, and has constructed a hide-action moral hazard model, from the dynamic angle to analyze the operator incentive structure question. Through the model analysis, found the operator superior stocks quantity(4)Constructed operator's most superior incentive and restrain structure from the incentive restraining and structure angle. In this article, according to the incentive restraint defferent, we first proposed dynamic "drive constraint matrix" concept, and elaborated the construction most superior incentive restrain structure importance through analyse our country state-owned enterprise reform's practice, and refenrence the most superior factor inputs theory, has constructed a most superior incentive restrain structure theoretically through using the production possible boundary and the non-difference curves.