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A Study On Bank's Loan Contract Based On Debtors' Corporate Governance

Posted on:2009-07-20Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:T X DingFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360272472248Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Liability is an important external financing channel of enterprises,and the bank's loan play important role in the listed company's liability financing,but because of the existing of the agency cost,the listed company faces the financing constrain.In China,the commercial banks have paid big attention to the financial data of debtors,and the private listed companies' financial data have played more important role in the loan contracting process,but the financial data is easy manipulated by debtors,and the commercial banks can not identify the earnings management,so the financial data's usefulness in the mitigation of financing constrain of loan contracting process is harmed.The information on corporate governance is the most basic and the most stabilized information,and it is the signaling mechanism before the loan contract,it also is the safeguarding mechanism after the loan contract,so it should have the function of mitigation the financing constrain.For long time,the Chinese scholars have not being interested in and involved the study on how the corporate governance influencing the bank loan contract,so the mechanism of corporate governance's influence on the bank loan contract and its economic result is a desiderate and practical problem for the commercial banks and the listed companies.This dissertation adopts the Chinese listed companies' archival data during year 2001 to 2006 as the sample,uses the normative and positive research method,to study the mechanism of corporate governance's influence on the bank loan contract and its economic result,and it pays more attention to the function difference between the state-owned listed companies' corporate governance and the private listed companies' corporate governance.This dissertation has following creative findings.①the internal corporate governance has important influence on the bank's loan contract,and the high level of internal corporate governance is helpful for mitigating the financing constrain.The first shareholder's share proportion is an important variable to the loan contract,and this influence is different between state-owned and private listed companies.The independent directors' ratio to all directors of private listed companies has influence on the term structure of loan contract,and moderate size of managers is helpful to the loan contracting.②the independent auditing has important influence on the loan contract.If the companies get nonstandard auditing opinions last year,then the loan size of the companies will be smaller,and above phenomenon is obvious among private companies.If the companies get nonstandard auditing opinions,then the loan term of the companies will be shorter.If the private companies choose big auditors,then the loan term will be longer.③the loan contract which are signed according to the clients' corporate governance level and the independent audit quality has good economic result.It finds that,the bigger the annual loan size,the better of listed companies' compositive performance;the bigger the annual loan size increase extent and the longer the loan term,the fewer the big shareholders' occupying the funds of the listed companies,and the better of listed companies' compositive performance;and comparing with state-owned companies,if the private companies get bigger annual loan size and get more long-term bank loan,the big shareholders' occupying the funds of the listed companies will be fewer,and the listed companies' compositive performance will be better.This dissertation argues that,for improving the safety and the efficiency of state-owned banks' loan,the creditor banks should pay more attentions to the debtors' corporate governance before signing the loan contract,and the creditor banks should look the corporate governance as the signaling mechanism and the monitoring mechanism of loan contract.This dissertation suggests that,the Chinese listed companies should perfect the corporate governance to mitigate the financing constrain.This dissertation also argues that,the government should accelerate the reform of state-owned enterprises and the state-owned banks,and make the state-owned enterprises to bear fewer burdens for society and policy,to rigidify the budget restriction.
Keywords/Search Tags:The listed companies, Corporate governance, Loan size, Loan term, Compositive performance, Assets occupying
PDF Full Text Request
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