The Study On Influencing Factors Of Controlling Right Transferring Of Chinese Listed Companies

The controlling rights are the focus of corporate governance and controlling right transferring is the indispensable component of governance mechanism of listed companies. The studies on companies' controlling right transferring are mainly focused on the efficiencies of controlling right transfer and the reasons of influencing transferring efficiencies. That is, these studies are concentrated on the results of controlling right transferring, and what cause controlling right transferring are neglected to some extent so present literatures about the influencing factors are rare and imperfect. Research of this issue can further perfect and enrich the controlling right theories and has practical meanings of it are as follows: firstly, sound investment advice can be given to institutional investors and private investors, and the takeover cost will be reduced and the probability of successful takeover will be increased; Secondly, because controlling right premium is sought during the controlling right transferring process, and the tunneling behavior of target companies are existed, so rational defense system can be designed by studying influencing factors of controlling right to help listed companies which are in takeover risk but not willing to be purchased to resist mergers and acquisitions. Thirdly, with the development of shareholder structure reform, shareholder structures of Chinese listed companies will be changed from partial circulation to full circulation, the investigation about this topic will be helpful for government to control state-owned listed companies which are closely related to the national economy and the people's livelihood efficiently, and assets reorganization and resource integration can be held based on this foundation, so to improve the efficiencies of state-owned listed companies and keep the development of national economics safely and stably. In this paper, the influencing factors of controlling right transferring are investigated comprehensively from theoretical and empirical point of view, and sound interpretations are given in the special system background of controlling right market in China.Above all, the concept of controlling right is defined. On the foundation of summarizing relative study results about controlling right transferring and the theory of transferring impetus of developed country, combining with the special system background of China capital market, possible influencing factors are analyzed and the corresponding test indices are established. This part is the theory introduction of successive empirical study of controlling right transferring of Chinese listed companies. Secondly, influencing factors are analyzed by using evolutionary game theory. Different from game theory adopted to study controlling right transferring in present literatures, from the evolutionary economics point of view, enterprise innovation, improving management efficiency and decreasing cost, etc, are considered as internal impetus of controlling right transferring in listed companies. Mathematical model is established adopting evolutionary game theory and it is proved that evolutionary stable strategy of evolutionary game result is existed about takeover people and dominators in the controlling right transferring market. That is, powerful investors enter takeover market and obtain the controlling right and weak investors exit the controlling right market. The choice of the dominator is to give up the controlling right. The conclusion theoretically proves that the causes of controlling right transferring are enterprise technical innovation, cost reduction, and the improvement of inefficient management. On the other hand, it also proves that controlling right transferring do improve corporation governance, optimize resource allocation ,and inspire enterprise innovation in efficient capital market.Thirdly, relative influence factors are analyzed by using single factor ANOVA method. In this thesis, annual data of all listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2002 to 2004 are used as samples, which are divided into two categories: listed companies whose controlling right are transferred and listed companies whose controlling right are not. Then 48 indices of corporate financial indices, shareholder structure and directorate characteristics are introduced, and variance test of equal mean about these indices of the two type corporations are made. The test results show that 38 indices, about 80% of all indices are of significant differences and 10 indices are insignificant statistically. So listed companies whose controlling right are transferred and companies whose controlling rights are not transferred are systematically different. Especially, means of innovation indices of companies whose controlling rights transferred are significantly higher than those companies whose controlling rights are not transferred, so the result of foregoing innovation that corporations is the important influencing factor is validated statistically again.Finally, econometrical models are adopted to study the influence factors of controlling right transferring. Different from Logit model adopted in domestic and foreign literatures, panel Logit model is used to investigate this issue. At first, theories of panel Logit model are expounded and summarized, then empirical tests of relative financial indices, shareholder structure and directorate characteristics are made using listed companies whose controlling rights were transferred in 2002-2004. The empirical results show that controlling right transferring are significantly influenced by 11 financial indices, such as total assets, net assets per share, indices of ownership concentration and the proportion of independent directorates. Afterwards, the listed companies are adopted as samples whose controlling right transferred in 2002-2006, and the impact of shareholder structure reform on controlling right transferring is studied using the panel Logit model. The main conclusions are that the shareholder structure reform improve the activity of the market for corporate control and increase the probebility of controlling right transferring.